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INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS, AND THE LEGACY OF
HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. v. UNITED STATES
LINDA C. MCCLAIN *
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I look at two contrasting ways in which arguments
about the Thirteenth Amendment’s declaration that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States”
featured in the enactment of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 2 the case in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Act. First, the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude makes a brief appearance in Heart of Atlanta Motel as an unsuccessful basis on which
the motel owner challenged Title II. 3 A similar claim arose in Congress when some lawmakers argued that the Thirteenth Amendment
posed an “insurmountable constitutional barrier” to a federal public
accommodations law because it compelled service. 4 The second role
played by the Thirteenth Amendment (barely discernible in Heart of
Atlanta Motel but more evident in the congressional debates over Title

Copyright © 2011 by Linda C. McClain.
*
Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of
Law. This Article grew out of a paper I presented at the the 2011 Maryland Constitutional
Law Schmooze on the Thirteenth Amendment, held on February 25 & 26. Thanks to organizer Mark Graber and to participants for helpful comments, and, in particular, to Garrett Epps and Rebecca Zietlow for pointing me toward additional research sources. I am
also grateful to Joseph Singer for insightful comments. Stefanie Weigmann, Head of Legal
Information Services, Pappas Library, and BU law students Darian Butcher and Hallie Marin provided valuable assistance with research. Comments are welcome: lmcclain@bu.edu.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a–a6 (2006)). For a detailed account of the legislative debates and political struggles that preceded the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title II, in particular,
see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL
SEGREGATION (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
2. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
3. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261.
4. S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 53 (1964) (Individual Views of Senator Strom Thurmond).
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II) was as a constitutional base for a public accommodations law because denial of service on the basis of race is a badge of servitude and
a vestige of slavery. 5
When the Heart of Atlanta Motel owner’s challenge to the constitutionality of Title II reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Court unanimously affirmed Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate private conduct through a civil rights statute affecting public accommodations. In so doing, the Court distinguished its
own (in)famous precedent, the Civil Rights Cases, 6 in which it held
that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments could not sustain
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, an earlier public accommodations law,
both because denial of equal accommodations was not a “badge of
slavery” or “involuntary servitude,” and because the Act reached private, not state, action. 7 As Congress, eighty years later, considered
passing a new public accommodations law, that case posed a formidable constitutional obstacle. Thus, the Administration and Congress
relied primarily on Congress’s power to regulate commerce and secondarily on the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In defending the law before the Court, the United States, in turn, relied on the commerce
power, allowing the Court to avoid considering whether “the remaining authority upon which [Congress] acted was . . . adequate.” 9 Nonetheless, the Thirteenth Amendment featured as a foundation for
such a law in congressional hearings and reports on the urgent need
for a national law ending discrimination in access to public accommodations and the need for Congress to complete the unfinished
business begun by the Reconstruction Amendments. 10 Conversely,
prominent congressional opponents of Title II argued that reliance
on the Thirteenth Amendment was “misplaced,” and that Title II
would enact involuntary servitude. 11
This Article examines how these contrasting ideas about the relationship between the Thirteenth Amendment and a public accommodations law—that it, on one hand, barred such a law, and, on the
other, that it justified such a law—featured in Heart of Atlanta Motel
5. See infra Part III.
6. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. Id. at 11, 24–26 (“[W]e are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has
nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude.”).
8. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (noting that the legislature realized that
the objectives of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “could be readily achieved” through using the
commerce power granted to Congress in the Constitution).
9. Id.
10. See infra Part III.A–C.
11. See infra Part III.E.
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and in the passage of Title II itself. Looking back at these contrasting
invocations of the Thirteenth Amendment may be useful to contemporary examinations of congressional authority to secure freedom
and equality, as well as to contemporary debates over the justifications
for and proper scope of antidiscrimination laws, and what is at stake
for persons protected by such laws and those challenging them.
Part II of this Article explicates the Heart of Atlanta Motel case.
The motel owner challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on several
grounds: that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce
Clause, and that the Act violated his Fifth Amendment liberty and
property rights, as well as (improbably) the Thirteenth Amendment. 12
These grounds reflected a particular conception of private property
rights rejected by the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and, prior to that,
by Congress and the executive in supporting Title II: that someone
who used his private property to operate a business had the liberty to
serve—or refuse to serve—whomever he pleased and to compel him
to serve was “involuntary servitude.” 13 To convey to readers something of the context and historical significance of this case, I augment
the case exposition with newspaper coverage of the motel owner’s legal challenge to Title II and its journey to the Supreme Court, as well
as some contemporaneous legal commentary on the case. 14 Part II also situates the case with two other Title II cases announced the same
day, Katzenbach v. McClung 15 and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 16 and with
the lawsuit brought against Atlanta restaurant owner Lester Maddox.
In explicating the case, I highlight several features of the majority and
concurring opinions with resonance for subsequent antidiscrimination laws and challenges to them. Although private property objections to public accommodations laws continue to surface, a newer
generation of challenges to antidiscrimination law emphasizes First
Amendment claims to religious liberty or freedom of association.
Part III turns from the Court’s upholding of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act to Congress’s deliberations about it, and considers the contrasting appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment in arguments made
12. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243–44.
13. See infra Parts II.D, III.B, III.E.
14. My sampling of press coverage draws on archives of national newspapers available
at Boston University’s library and on archives of several southern newspapers available at
Harvard University’s library. Thanks to my research assistant Hallie Marin for retrieving
these sources. I thank my former colleague John DeWitt Gregory for suggesting that I
look at contemporary news coverage, something he and Joanna Grossman did in their informative article, The Legacy of Loving, 51 HOW. L.J. 15 (2007).
15. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
16. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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both for and against the public accommodations law. This look at the
legislative record is important because reading the case in isolation
from this legislative record would leave a reader ignorant of just how
strongly concerns for rectifying an intolerable injustice that should
have ended long ago animated executive and legislative support for
Title II. Thus, a significant part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel
is simply the fact that the Court did uphold this new federal law so
that it did not meet the fate of its 1875 predecessor. 17 Part III concludes by noting that recent commemorations of the Civil Rights Act
speak of Congress completing important unfinished business, even as
some dissenting voices continue to object to the law’s incursion on liberty and property rights.
In Part IV, I look at how certain themes in Heart of Atlanta Motel
recur in subsequent Supreme Court cases. An instructive example is
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 18 in which, twenty years later, the Court
upheld a state public accommodations law and cited Heart of Atlanta
Motel when it analogized the dignitary harms of exclusion based on
race to those based on sex. 19 In contrast, later Supreme Court cases,
such as United States v. Lopez 20 and United States v. Morrison, 21 distinguish Heart of Atlanta Motel in troubling ways, marking a muchcommented upon shift away from the Court’s deference to Congress’s
expansive use of its commerce power to remedy moral evils that hinder equality.
In the Conclusion, I turn briefly to present day arguments that
are critical of the expansive scope of current public accommodations
law, particularly when the inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category appears to threaten religious liberty and freedom of
expressive association. Opponents of such laws may not appeal to the
Thirteenth Amendment, but they do use the language of being forced
or compelled to render service in violation of conscience. At the
heart of this contemporary debate is the extent to which race is a special case and to which this important precedent about eradicating
race discrimination is—and is not—a helpful template for remedying
sex and sexual orientation discrimination.

17. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
18. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
19. Id. at 625, 628–29.
20. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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II. REVISITING HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC. V. UNITED STATES
A. The Legal Challenges to Title II in Context
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, a motel operator
challenged the constitutionality of the newly enacted Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides, in relevant part: “All persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 22 The definition of public accommodation included,
among “establishments . . . which serve[] the public,” “any inn, hotel,
motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests, other than an establishment located within a building which
contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence.” 23
Title II also reaches “‘discrimination or segregation’ . . . supported by state action,” which means “when carried on under color of
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or enforced by officials of the State or any of its subdivisions.” 24
Thus, the law contains an affirmative declaration:
[T]hat all persons “shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any
kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to
be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule,
or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.” 25

22. 379 U.S. 241, 247 (1964) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243) (intenal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 201(b), 78 Stat. at 243) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The “so-called ‘Mrs. Murphy’s Boarding House’” exemption was a “congressional concession to a reductio ad absurdum”—even before the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act was written, opponents of President Kennedy’s directive to
Congress to pass such an act “appealed to the emotions by painting a vivid portrait of the
ancient widow operating a three or four room tourist home who would, by force of the
bill, be required to accommodate transients without regard to race.” Harry T. Quick, Public Accommodations: A Justification of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 W. RES. L. REV.
660, 672 (1965).
24. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 248 (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 201(d), 78 Stat. at
243).
25. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act, § 202, 78 Stat. at 244).
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Title II contained various exceptions, including for private clubs under certain conditions. 26
On July 2, 1964, just “2 hours and 10 minutes after President
Johnson signed” the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Moreton Rolleston, president and operator of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, filed his challenge
to Title II in federal district court in Atlanta. 27 Rolleston, an attorney,
represented himself in the legal challenge, including arguing before
the Supreme Court. 28 Contemporary press reports noted that “[t]he
Heart of Atlanta Motel has been the target of repeated demonstrations and sit-ins by Negro and white civil rights workers.” 29 As the
Court recounted (and as newspapers confirm), “[p]rior to passage of
the Act the motel had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to
Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to do so. In an
effort to perpetuate that policy this suit was filed.” 30 Rolleston argued
“that Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate
commerce.” 31 He asserted additional constitutional claims: the law
deprived the motel “of the right to choose its customers and operate
its business as it wishes, resulting in a taking of its liberty and property
without due process of law and a taking of its property without just
compensation.” 32 Rolleston “asked $11 million in damages” (in the
event he had to comply with the law), contending that desegregation
“would ruin his business, reputation and goodwill.” 33 Pertinent to this
symposium’s topic, he also alleged that Congress subjected the motel
to “involuntary servitude,” violating the Thirteenth Amendment. 34
“Involuntary servitude” was also a cry of Lester Maddox, owner of
the Atlanta-based Pickrick Restaurant and the target of a lawsuit
brought under Title II by three Negro 35 ministers, Rev. George Willis
26. Civil Rights Act, § 201(e), 78 Stat. at 243–44.
27. Atlanta Motel Sues in Major Test of Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1964, at 1.
28. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 242 (noting that Moreton Rolleston, Jr.,
represents the appellant).
29. Hotelier Brings $11 Million Rights Action, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 1964, at 7.
30. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
31. Id. at 243–44.
32. Id.
33. Atlanta Motel Sues in Major Test of Rights Act, supra note 27, at 1. One million dollars
was for deprivation of property rights, and $10 million for deprivation of his liberty right
to refuse service. Id.
34. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 244.
35. The terms “Negro” and “Negroes,” rather than African-American or black, are the
terms employed in the historical materials that I discuss in this article. Therefore, I use
these terms when I quote or paraphrase sources. “Negro” was “the standard preferential
term” used by blacks from the early twentieth century to “until the late 1960s,” when
“‘Black,’ and now perhaps . . . ‘African American’” became the “preferred term.” Tom W.
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Jr., Rev. Woodrow T. Lewis, and Rev. Albert Dunn. Although the ultimate companion case to Heart of Atlanta Motel was Katzenbach v.
McClung, which upheld Title II against a challenge brought by Ollie’s
Barbeque, the initial pairing in the press was with a lawsuit brought by
Willis, Lewis, and Dunn against Maddox for refusing to comply with
Title II. On July 3, 1964, when these three men sought entrance to
Maddox’s restaurant, Maddox proceeded to chase them away at gunpoint. 36 In contemporary press coverage, Maddox appears as a defiant and violent segregationist, brandishing axe handles against Negroes who sought to enter his restaurant and rallying his white
customers to join him in turning them away. 37 Along with “home-style
fare,” Maddox also offered up “homespun political commentary”
through the voice of “Pickrick,” in “Pickrick Says” advertisements in
the Atlanta Journal Constitution. 38 Atlanta Mayor Ivan Allen testified in
Congress in support of Title II and many Atlanta businesses desegregated before its passage. By contrast, Maddox’s Pickrick remained
“stubbornly wedded to the segregationist Jim Crow policies;” his restaurant became “a conspicuous symbol of segregationist defiance,”
and “an immediate target of civil rights activists seeking to test the
new law.” 39 A radio station employee introduced a transcript into the
district court proceedings in which Maddox vehemently expressed his
scorn for desegregation and its advocates: “This property belongs to
me, my wife and my children. The white people have got enough of
Smith, Changing Racial Labels: From “Colored” to “Negro” to “Black” to “African American,” 56
PUBLIC OPINION Q. 496, 476–97 (1992). The term had “considerable handicaps to overcome,” since it “tended to be used as a term of reproach by Whites and suffered from its
association” with certain racial epithets. Id. at 498. However, it was “defined to stand for a
new way of thinking about Blacks”: “Racial progress and the hopes and aspirations of
Blacks (especially as illustrated by [Booker T.] Washington’s self-help ideology) were to be
captured by the term ‘Negro,’ and old racial patterns in general and Southern racial traditions in particular were to be left behind with “Colored.’” Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I
Have a Dream” speech in 1963 “favored the term ‘Negro,’” and used the term “Black” as
an adjective and only in parallel construction with White.” Nonetheless, “as the civil rights
movement began making tangible progress,” some argued that a new term, “Black,” was
needed to “shed the remnants of slavery and racial serfdom.” Id. at 499–501.
36. Black Upholds Rights Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 1964, at 1 (quoting Maddox);
U.S. Seeks to Join Atlanta Suit on Enforcement of Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1964, at 17 (reporting incident).
37. United Press International, Atlanta Restaurant Defies High Court, Again Bars Negroes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1964, at 1. In sharp contrast, contemporary press reports depict Mr.
Rolleston as an hotelier and attorney who opposed the law, but after an initial federal
court ruling against him, announced he would comply with it pending the appeal. Id.
38. Government & Politics: Lester Maddox (1915–2003), THE NEW GEORGIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (April 4, 2004), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article/
jsp?id=h-1387.
39. Id.
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this and it’s not because of the Negroes. It’s because of renegades
like Lyndon Johnson and Ivan Allen.” 40
The Department of Justice successfully moved to intervene in the
lawsuit against Maddox’s restaurant as well as for the appointment of
a three-judge panel (or, as the Boston Globe put it, “a three-man Federal court”) to have a prompt hearing of the challenges to Title II. 41 On
July 22, 1964, the panel upheld Title II and issued injunctions against
Heart of Atlanta Motel and the Pickrick Restaurant. 42 The court
stayed the injunction until August 11 to allow time for direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. 43
The restaurant and motel owners announced that they would abide by the order, but as August 11 approached, they appealed to Justice Hugo L. Black for an order staying enforcement of the injunction
until final action by the Supreme Court, on the ground that, otherwise, their businesses would be irreparably injured. Justice Black
turned down the request, triggering Maddox’s public remark about
involuntary servitude: “We are just really hurt that our government
will tell us that we no longer can be free as Americans and no longer
can we select our customers. It’s involuntary servitude; it’s slavery of
the first order; it shows contempt, utter disregard for the United
States Constitution.” 44 He vowed: “We will never integrate. Pickrick
will never integrate.” 45 On August 11, Maddox, “armed with a pistol
and backed by 200 cheering whites, defied the nation’s new Civil
Rights Law again by . . . turning three Negroes away from his restaurant,” shouting “You’re dirty Communists and you’ll never get a piece

40. E. W. Kenworthy, 2 Rights Act Suits Argued in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1964, at 20.
On Title II’s passage, Mayor Allen urged Atlantans to obey the law, while also urging Atlanta Negroes to “use their ‘new rights in such a manner as to create the least possible inconvenience, disorder, or hurt feelings.’” Marion Gaines, Mayor Asks Restraint by Negroes,
ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1964, at 1.
41. Early Hearing for Test Case, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1964, at 2.
42. Achsah Posey, Federal Court Orders Maddox and Motel to Serve Negroes, ATLANTA
CONST., July 23, 1964, at 1. In addition to running this front-page story with a large headline, the Atlanta Constitution also published the text of the rulings: Text of Verdict on Pickrick:
‘Congress Can Deal with Bias,’ ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1964, at 18; Text of Decision on Suit by
Motel, ATLANTA CONST., July 23, 1964, at 18.
43. Three Judges Reject Cafe, Motel Attack: Court Holds off Injunctions to Allow Appeal, CHI.
TRIB., July 23, 1964, at 1.
44. Black Upholds Rights Law, supra note 36, at 1. Maddox also asserted: “I’m so shocked
that I’ve got to forego my rights under the Constitution to satisfy the agitators and the attorney general.” Achsah Posey, Motel to Comply with Order but Maddox Is Undecided, ATLANTA
CONST., Aug. 11, 1964, at 1, 6 (quoting Maddox) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Won’t Block Rights Law: Black Refuses to Halt Enforcement, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1964, at
12 (quoting Maddox) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of fried chicken here.” 46 After the U.S. Attorney General obtained an
order from federal court requiring Maddox to show why he should
not be held in civil contempt for this refusal of service, 47 Maddox
closed Pickrick restaurant “for good.” 48 Crying, Maddox blamed the
President, Congress, and the Communists for closing his business and
ending “a childhood dream,” and then, addressing the gathered
crowd at length, he “cit[ed] numerous passages of Scripture.” By
contrast, Rolleston, owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, said he
would obey the court. 49
In denying the request for a stay, Justice Black’s memorandum
referred to the power to grant a stay as an “awesome responsibility
calling for the upmost circumspection in its exercise,” all the more so
when a single member of the Court “is asked to delay the will of Congress to put its policies into effect at the time it desires.” 50 Justice
Black, news reports emphasized, said the Civil Rights Act did not result from sudden, impulsive action, but “represented the culmination
of one of the most thoroughgoing debates in the history of Congress.” 51 Justice Black stated “that ‘a judicial restraint of enforcement
of one of the most important sections of the Civil Rights Act would, in
my judgment, be unjustifiable.’” 52 Declining to address the constitutionality of the particular provisions of the Civil Rights Act under attack, he nonetheless expressed his belief “that the broad grants of
power to Congress in the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment are enough to show that Congress does have at least general
constitutional authority to control commerce among the states and to
enforce the 14th Amendment’s policy against racial discrimination.” 53
Justice Black’s focus upon the Fourteenth Amendment alongside the
Commerce Clause as a source of Congressional authority for the Civil
Rights Act would set him (and some other Justices) apart from the
majority when the Court actually ruled on the merits of the motel’s
challenge.

46. United Press International, supra note 37, at 1.
47. Achsah Posey & Ted Simmons, Maddox Ordered into U.S. Court in Contempt Suit,
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 13, 1964, at 1.
48. Cafe Is Closed for Good, Maddox Cries After He Bars 2 Negroes at Door, ATLANTA CONST.,
Aug. 14, 1964, at 1.
49. Id.
50. Black Upholds Civil Rights Law, supra note 36, at 2.
51. Id.; Rights Law Stay Denied by Black, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1964, at 24.
52. Rights Law Stay Denied by Black, supra note 51, at 24.
53. Id.
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B. Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court agreed to hear oral argument on the motel’s
challenge on the opening day of its fall term, departing from its usual
practice in order to honor the request by both sides for a prompt
hearing. 54 The Court would also hear a challenge to Title II brought
by owners of a different restaurant, Ollie’s Barbeque, a challenge sustained by a three-judge panel of a federal district court in Birmingham, Alabama. 55 In that challenge, owners Ollie McClung Sr. and his
son Ollie Jr. alleged that their restaurant did not cater to transients,
but to local customers (although not those living in the Negro neighborhood where it was located, except through a “take-out service for
Negroes” 56) and, thus, was not engaged in interstate commerce. 57
They alleged that they would lose $200,000 annually if forced to serve
Negroes. 58
By contrast to Ollie’s Barbeque, whose connection to interstate
commerce was not its clientele but the food “procured [by a local
supplier] from outside the State,” 59 the Heart of Atlanta Motel clearly
did business across state lines; not only through “national advertising”
but also by accepting “convention trade from outside Georgia and
approximately 75% of its registered guests [were] from out of State.” 60
Thus, if Title II was constitutional, it would clearly apply to the motel.
Prior to passage of Title II, it “had followed a practice of refusing to
rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended to continue to
do so.” 61 Defending Title II, the United States “counter[ed] that the
unavailability to Negroes of adequate accommodation interferes significantly with interstate travel,” and that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress “to remove such obstructions and restraints.” 62

54. Marjorie Hunter, Supreme Court to Speed Test Of Key Clause in the Rights Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1964, at 24. By this time, the Pickrick Restaurant was not part of the hearing because, as noted above, Maddox closed the restaurant rather than integrate. Subsequently, Maddox opened a segregated cafe, and, in 1966, amidst “widespread dissatisfaction with desegregation,” became governor of Georgia. See “Government & Politics,” supra
note 38.
55. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964).
56. Id. at 296.
57. McClung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815, 817–18 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1964), rev’d, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
58. Court Says Rights Law Invalid in Restaurant Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18, 1964, at 8.
59. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296.
60. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 244.
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1. The Involuntary Servitude Argument as Surprising Even Alice
The United States also met Rolleston’s Thirteenth Amendment
argument. At oral argument, Rolleston elaborated his Thirteenth
Amendment theory. He cited Hodges v. United States, which held that
involuntary servitude included “compulsory service of one to another,” 63 and stated that other cases “have held that if a person is forced
to serve another in business ways,” such involuntary servitude violated
the Thirteenth Amendment. 64 The government labeled as “entirely
frivolous” the contention that “an amendment directed to the abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread disabilities associated with slavery places discrimination in public accommodations,
beyond the reach of both federal and state law.” 65 In the Justice Department’s brief, filed by Solicitor General Archibald Cox and Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, the Department argued: “No
one can seriously contend that requiring a motel proprietor to accommodate Negroes on the basis of equality with guests of other races
so long as he chooses to stay in business is ‘akin to African slavery.’” 66
At oral argument, Solicitor General Cox dismissed Rolleston’s
argument in vivid terms, suggesting that it would surprise “Alice, . . .
even at the end of her long journey through wonderland,” if she were
told
that the restaurants and other places of public accommodation in 33 states in the year 1964 are held in involuntary servitude and that the Anglo-American common law for centuries has subjected to slavery innkeepers, hackmen, carriers,
wharfage men, ferriers, all kinds of other people holding
themselves out to serve the public. 67
Elements of this rebuttal echo in the Court’s rejection of the motel’s
involuntary servitude claim:
As we have seen, 32 States prohibit racial discrimination in
public accommodations. These laws but codify the common-law innkeeper rule which long predated the Thirteenth
Amendment. It is difficult to believe that the Amendment
was intended to abrogate this principle. Indeed, the opinion of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases is to the con63. 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
64. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1964, at 24.
65. Id.
66. In Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1964, at 8.
67. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, supra note 64, at 24.
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trary . . . it having noted with approval the laws of “all the
States” prohibiting discrimination. We could not say that
the requirements of the Act in this regard are in any way
“akin to African slavery.” 68
Interestingly, for the proposition that the Act’s requirement is
not “akin to African slavery,” the Court cited to Butler v. Perry, which
upheld Florida’s long-standing law that “[e]very able-bodied male
person” between twenty-one and forty-five was subject to working on
the roads and bridges for several days each year against a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge. 69 The Court’s reasoning was that such labor
was “a part of the duty” that each man owed “to the public,” rooted in
the common law, and that Congress surely did not mean, in enacting
the Thirteenth Amendment, to introduce any “novel doctrine[s]” or
“interdict” public duties: “The great purpose in view was liberty under
the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.” 70 The Court seemed to be
analogizing the public duties at issue in that earlier case to the public
duties of innkeepers, similarly rooted in common law but codified by
state statute and similarly unthreatened by the Thirteenth Amendment.
2. What To Do About the Civil Rights Cases?
The Court readily concluded that Title II was constitutional as an
exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 71 But it
72
first had to reckon with its previous decision in the Civil Rights Cases,
which struck down Congress’s 1875 public accommodations law (Civil
Rights Act of 1875). 73 The Court declared the Civil Rights Cases “inapposite and without precedential value” as to the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.74 To make this point, it contrasted the
68. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332
(1916)).
69. Butler, 240 U.S. at 329–31.
70. Id. at 330, 333.
71. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250.
72. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
73. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
74. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250. There is an enormous amount of scholarly
literature—to which some authors in this symposium have made valuable contributions—
critical of the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence that thwarted Congress’s efforts,
through civil rights laws, to implement the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies
the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 191–96 (2005); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revo-
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earlier civil rights public accommodations law with the present one:
the former did not limit categories of affected business to those “impinging upon interstate commerce,” while the new Act carefully did
so, except where state action was involved (in which case the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress a constitutional hook). 75
Moreover, that earlier Congress did not fully consider whether
the commerce power provided support for the 1875 Act. That Act,
the Court explained, “was not ‘conceived’ in terms of the commerce
power,” but rather, in terms of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. 76 Thus, the earlier case is “devoid of authority
for the proposition” that Congress lacks authority, under the Commerce Clause, “to regulate discriminatory practices now found substantially to affect interstate commerce.” By contrast, the contemporary Court’s decision upheld an Act that “explicitly relies upon the
commerce power, and where the record is filled with testimony of obstructions and restraints resulting from the discriminations found to
be existing.” 77 Because it found the commerce power sufficient to
uphold Title II, the Court neither considered the other grounds on
which Congress relied nor addressed whether Congress had sufficient
power to act under Section 5 or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 78
Although the Court only obliquely acknowledged that its predecessor, in the Civil Rights Cases, rejected the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as constitutional pegs for the Civil Rights Act of
1875, it is worth revisiting that treatment briefly. The fate of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 before an earlier Supreme Court undeniably led
the later Congress to find a less vulnerable constitutional peg for its
public accommodations law. 79 As one contemporary defense of Title
II put it, the Court’s earlier answer to the argument that “denial of
access to places of public accommodation was a badge or incident of
slavery” (and thus barred by the Thirteenth Amendment) was “ab-

lutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,
893–99 (1986); Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment,
71 MD. L. REV. 40 (2011). Discussing that literature is beyond the scope of this paper.
75. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250–51.
76. Id. at 251.
77. Id. at 252.
78. The Court states: “This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it
acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the
commerce power is sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.” Id. at
250.
79. See, e.g., Quick, supra note 23, at 683; see infra Part III for discussion.
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rupt”: “Justice Bradley dismissed the argument as ‘running the slavery
argument into the ground.’” 80 Justice Bradley further stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in
the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected. 81
In support, Justice Bradley observed that, prior to the abolition
of slavery and enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, freedmen
enjoyed “all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same
as white citizens,” but no one argued that it invaded their status as
freedmen because of “discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement. Mere
discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as
badges of slavery.” 82 Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment ground the
1875 law, since it reached only state laws or state action, not private
discrimination. 83 The Court noted that a remedy might be sought
under state laws concerning innkeepers and public carriers, or, “[i]f
the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination,” then Congress
may afford a remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment. 84
In a forceful and famous dissent, Justice Harlan contended that
discrimination in access to public accommodations “is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power,
by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.” 85
Taking up the majority’s argument that Congress lacked authority
under the Thirteenth Amendment “to adjust what may be called the
social rights of men and races in the community,” he retorted that
what is at stake are not “social rights,” but constitutional rights to civil
80. Quick, supra note 23, at 683 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19
(1883)).
81. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 13 (“And so in the present case, until some state law has been passed, or
some state action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United
States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called
into activity, for the prohibitions of the amendment are against state laws and acts done
under state authority.”).
84. Id. at 25.
85. Id. at 43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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freedoms. 86 Thus, the rights the 1875 Act endeavored to secure and
protect are legal rights:
The right, for instance, of a colored citizen to use the accommodations of a public highway, upon the same terms as
are permitted to white citizens is no more a social right than
his right, under the law, to use the public streets of a city or
a town, or a turnpike road, or a public market, or a post office, or his right to sit in a public building with others, of
whatever race, for the purpose of hearing the political questions of the day discussed. 87
Justice Harlan reminded the Court of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment and that it “did
something more than to prohibit slavery as an institution;” it also “established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the United
States.” 88 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 undertook to secure to all citizens “those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom;” because the institution of slavery “rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily
involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination
against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as
Justice Harlan stressed
belong to freemen of other races.” 89
“[e]xemption from race discrimination in respect of the civil rights
which are fundamental in citizenship in a republican government” as a
new constitutional right, “with express power in Congress, by legislation, to enforce” it. 90 Justice Harlan also concluded that public accommodations are, in effect, agents of the state. An innkeeper exercises “a quasi public employment,” and “[t]he public nature of his
employment forbids him from discriminating” based on race. 91 Similarly, licensing gives amusement a public status. 92 Thus, he viewed the
entities covered by the 1875 Act as “agents of the state.” 93

86. Id. at 59.
87. Id. at 59–60.
88. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 35, 36.
90. Id. at 56.
91. Id. at 40–41.
92. See id. at 41 (noting “that places of public amusement . . . are established and maintained under direct license of law [and] [t]he authority to establish and maintain them
comes from the public”).
93. Id. at 58–59 (“In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of
places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities of the State . . . .”).
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Finally, tackling Justice Bradley’s reference to the man “emerged
from slavery” who, after the aid of “beneficent legislation,” must cease
to be a special favorite of the law, Justice Harlan countered:
It is . . . scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the
special favorite of the laws. . . . What the nation, through
Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that
race, is . . . to secure and protect rights belonging to them as
freemen and citizens . . . . The one underlying purpose of
congressional legislation has been to enable the black race
to take the rank of mere citizens. 94
Justice Harlan continued by analyzing forms of class tyranny in the
nation’s history, suggesting that “[t]o-day, it is the colored race which
is denied, by corporations and individuals wielding public authority,
rights fundamental in their freedom and citizenship.” 95 As I discuss in
Part III, both Justice Bradley’s and Justice Harlan’s opinions featured
prominently in Congressional consideration of Title II.
3. Congress Reenters the Civil Rights Field
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court did not explicitly revisit this
earlier disagreement between the majority in the Civil Rights Cases and
Justice Harlan, in dissent, over the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It did note one consequence of the Civil Rights Cases:
the long hiatus between when Congress enacted the first Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and, nearly a century later, when it enacted the series of
civil rights acts in the late 1950s and early 1960s.96 How and when did
Congress reenter the field? The Court detailed the legislative history
of the modern Civil Rights Act, beginning with President Kennedy’s
call for civil rights legislation, and the stated purpose of the proposed
bill he sent Congress: “‘to promote the general welfare by eliminating
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in . . .
public accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the
powers conferred upon it . . . to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments . . . .’” 97
As finally adopted, the Court observed, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, of which Title II was a part, “was most comprehensive, undertaking to prevent through peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimination in voting, as well as in places of accommodation and public facili94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964).
Id. (alterations in both) (citations omitted).
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ties, federally secured programs and in employment.” 98 The Court
cited to legislative history making “it quite clear that the fundamental
object of Title II was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.’” 99 “At the same time, however,” the Court continued, Congress concluded it could achieve this objective “‘by congressional action based on the commerce power of the Constitution.’” 100 I shall
return to this language about dignity in explicating how Heart of Atlanta Motel features in more recent public accommodations cases. Most
pertinent to Title II, however, is that some members of the Court and
of Congress thought that a prudential approach rooted in the commerce power fundamentally obscured the significant equality and citizenship issues at stake. 101
4. Ending Discrimination Through Peaceful and Voluntary
Settlement: Demonstrations and Demanding Service as the
Backdrop of Title II
Worthy of comment in the above history is the Court’s reference
to “peaceful and voluntary settlement.” 102 However, the Court simply
echoed the stated purpose in the Senate Report on the law, but gave
no feeling for lawmakers’ sense of urgency with respect to finding that
settlement. 103
Contemporaneous writings situate Title II in the context of numerous, repeated, peaceful efforts by African-American citizens—
often side-by-side with white civil rights advocates—to integrate lunch
counters, soda fountains, restaurants, and hotels, and, in effect demand service on equal terms. For example, an essay about the sit-in
movement by civil rights attorney Marion A. Wright observed that
“[t]he Freedom Rides shared a common parentage with the sit-ins—
they both spring from a firm resolve to exercise full rights as American citizens” and “are both characterized by nonviolence.” 104 The
98. Id. at 246.
99. Id. at 250 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 16).
100. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 17).
101. See discussion infra Parts II & III.
102. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 246.
103. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 1 (“The purpose of S. 1732 is to achieve a
peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation by establishments doing business with the general public, and
by labor unions and professional, business, and trade associations.”).
104. Marion A. Wright, Public Accommodations: The Sit-in Movement: Progress Report and
Prognosis, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 89, 89 (Donald B. King &
Charles W. Quick eds., 1965).
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Freedom Riders were successful “primarily due to the interstate nature of most travel, and state involvement with intrastate travel, rendering action by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the federal courts readily obtainable and effective.” 105 By contrast, sit-ins,
“dealing with public accommodations in a variety of circumstances,
and . . . jurisdictions,” experienced more “vicissitudes of fortune.” 106
He reported that the sit-ins began in 1960 when “four black students
at North Carolina A. & T. College in Greensboro” attempted to get
coffee at the dime store, and when “[t]he manager said he could not
serve them because of local custom, … they just sat and waited.” 107
Soon after, other students at their own school and later from some
other colleges joined them for future visits. 108 Heckling by white teenagers ensued, and “white boys waved Confederate flags, chanted,
and cursed.” 109 After management received a bomb threat, “the police emptied the store,” and the store reopened, but with its lunch
counters closed. 110 Wright added that the sit-in movement “spread
electrically throughout the entire South. Negro and white demonstrators, principally college students, aided by a sprinkling of professors, ministers, social workers, and others, peacably invaded and picketed lunch counters, picture shows, parks, beaches, and other
segregated places of entertainment, amusement, and public accommodation.” 111
This movement “wrought a transformation of southern customs,”
with “capitulation,” in the majority of cases, coming “peacefully, almost gracefully,” as “many inn-keepers welcomed the pressure which
enabled them to act.” 112 But alongside such change was resistance, often taking the form of invoking (sometimes newly-passed) state trespass or criminal mischief laws to convict demonstrators, which led to a
“spate of cases . . . work[ing] their way to courts of last resort.” 113

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 90 (quoting Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 317).
108. Pollitt, supra note 107, at 317–18.
109. Id. at 318.
110. Id.
111. Wright, supra note 104, at 90–91.
112. Id. at 91.
113. Id.; see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 488 (2000) (“Only after
the federal courts were clogged with thousands of such cases did the Kennedy Justice Department and a bipartisan congressional coalition decide to draft federal legislation outlawing racial discrimination by business establishments and employers.”).
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While there were “many exceptions,” innkeepers generally prevailed
in southern state courts, and demonstrators, in federal courts. 114
The prevalence of such trespass suits and the imperative that
Title II secure a peaceful settlement of a national problem are evident
in the fact that, the same day in which the Court announced its Heart
of Atlanta Motel and McClung rulings, it also announced Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill. 115 In Hamm, the Court ruled that the passage of Title II
abated convictions secured prior to its passage based on state trespass
charges applied to Negroes for participating in “sit-in” demonstrations in luncheon facilities of retail stores in South Carolina and Arkansas. 116 In reasoning that, just as “the Act would abate all federal
prosecutions,” it should also, “by virtue of the Supremacy Clause,” abate pending state convictions, the Court stated: “The great purpose of
the civil rights legislation was to obliterate the effect of a distressing
chapter of our history.” 117 The Court elaborated:
Congress, as well as the two Presidents who recommended
the legislation, clearly intended to eradicate an unhappy
chapter in our history. The peaceful conduct for which petitioners were prosecuted was on behalf of a principle since
embodied in the law of the land. The convictions were
based on the theory that the rights of a property owner had
been violated. However, the supposed right to discriminate
on the basis of race, at least in covered establishments, was
nullified by the statute. 118
In contrast to Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, which were 9to-0 decisions, Hamm was a 5-to-4 decision. Title II’s concern for
peaceful settlement also animated the dissents, although the dissenters reached different conclusions about the retroactive import of
Title II for civil disobedience. Justice Black, for example, disclaimed
any interpretation of Title II that would permit persons “refused service a ‘right’ to take the law into their own hands by sitting down and
occupying the premises for as long as they choose to stay.” 119 To the
contrary, “one of the chief purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
to take such disputes out of the streets and restaurants and into the
courts, which Congress has granted the power to provide an adequate

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Wright, supra note 104, at 91.
379 U.S. 306 (1964).
Id. at 307, 317.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting).
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and orderly judicial remedy.” 120 Here, the same extensive and thorough legislative history that led Justice Black to decline to stay the
lower court’s injunction in Heart of Atlanta Motel led him to reject an
interpretation of Title II in the face of legislative silence:
[I]n what is perhaps the most extensive and careful legislative history ever compiled, dealing with one of the most thoroughly discussed and debated bills ever passed by Congress,
a history including millions and millions of words written on
tens of thousands of pages contained in volumes weighing
well over half a hundred pounds, in which every conceivable
aspect and application of the 1964 Act were discussed ad infinitum, not even once did a single sponsor, proponent or
opponent of the Act intimate a hope or express a fear that
the Act was intended to have the effect which the Court
gives it today. 121
Justice White echoed Justice Black on the silence in the legislative record, contending that such silence should lead to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the majority. The disruptive effects of civil
disobedience also counseled this interpretation: “[H]ad Congress intended to ratify massive disobedience to the law, so often attended by
violence, I feel sure it would have said so in unmistakable language . . . .” 122
Although Heart of Atlanta Motel stressed discrimination’s burden
on interstate commerce in terms of its impact upon AfricanAmericans’ freedom to travel, lawmakers and contemporaneous
commentators on Title II also stress the downward economic impact
of “racial strife”—segregation and demonstrations challenging it. 123
These twin burdens are evident in Solicitor General Archibald Cox’s
oral argument before the Court. He argued that Congress made a
record that segregation “was creating a grave national problem,” giving statistics both about the burdens on travel suffered by Negroes
and about the number of demonstrations in 174 cities, thirty-two
states, and the District of Columbia, “[a]bout a third of [which] were
120. Id. at 318–19.
121. Id. at 321–22 (White, J., dissenting). Also dissenting, Justice Harlan stated: “I entirely agree with my Brother BLACK’S poignant observations on this score; there is not a
scintilla of evidence which remotely suggests that Congress had any such revolutionary
course in mind.” Id. at 324 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 328 (White, J., dissenting).
123. Quick, supra note 23, at 664–65 (referring to “racial strife”); Additional Views on
H.R. 7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch et al., H. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 9–13 (1963)
(detailing as burdens on commerce the dampening of travel and the economic toll of
demonstrations and segregation).
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concerned solely with discrimination in places of public accommodation.” 124 Cox went on to speak of the “tremendous” effect of these
“demonstrations, picketing, boycotts, other forms of protest, upon
business conditions,” and therefore, “upon interstate commerce.” 125
With this background in mind, let us return to the Court’s statement that the Civil Rights Act undertook “to prevent through peaceful and voluntary settlement discrimination . . . in places of public acFor example, one
commodation and public facilities.” 126
contemporaneous commentator on Title II predicted (too optimistically) its impact:
Happily, the civil disobedience and the beatings related to
public accommodations are well-nigh over. Now the cause
seekers can move on to more fertile areas such as voting
rights, employment and housing. Equally appreciated will
be the demise of the “rednecked” bully more than anxious
to take advantage of peaceful protest. Perhaps a measure of
the violence can be relegated to the limbo of forgotten history. 127
I say “too optimistically” because peaceful attempts by AfricanAmericans to exercise the new rights secured by the Civil Rights Act
and to move on, as the author suggests, to voting rights, brought new
clashes and sometimes violence. News stories reporting on Moreton
Rolleston’s lawsuit also report, for example, on arrests of Negroes for
seeking service at restaurants, jailing of Negroes and whites for
launching a voter registration campaign, violent altercations at movie
theaters, whites firing shots into a hall of Negroes holding a voter registration rally, and a series of fires at Negro churches in Mississippi.128
In denying Heart of Atlanta’s request for a stay, Justice Black observed the thorough national debate over the Civil Rights Act. Legal
commentators at the time referred to Title II as passing “only after a
fiery congressional debate,” 129 and as “produc[ing] the greatest
amount of controversy because of its intensely personal character.” 130
124. Excerpts from Rights Case Argument, supra note 64, at 24.
125. Id.
126. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246 (1964).
127. Quick, supra note 23, at 709.
128. As FBI Chief Left, Delta Church Burned, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1964, at 36; Hotelier
Brings $11 Million Rights Action, supra note 29, at 7; New Clashes Mark Tests of Rights Law,
CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1964, at 7.
129. Melville B. Nimmer, A Proposal for Judicial Validation of a Previously Unconstitutional
Law: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1394, 1394 (1965).
130. Quick, supra note 23, at 661; see also Nimmer, supra note 129, at 1394 (calling Title
II “[b]y far the most controversial aspect” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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By the time Congress enacted Title II, the prevalence of discrimination in public accommodations had become a national and international embarrassment. 131 As one legal commentator observed: “The
myriad consequences to the United States nationally and internationally of dual racial standards under a single political ideal are the true
focus of national legislative concern.” 132 Title II, thus, was soon “regarded in many quarters as a token of the nation’s sincerity in moving
to resolve the ‘American dilemma.’” 133
On this point of sincerity and resolution, it is important not to
treat the resistance of Rolleston, Maddox, and Ollie’s Barbeque to the
law as emblematic of southern reaction. For example, side-by-side in
the Atlanta Constitution’s news stories about those legal challenges
were headlines such as “U.S. Responding Well To Rights Law, Says a
Pleased President,” 134 “Comply in Peace, Both Races Urge,” 135
“Pleased by Rights Compliance, NAACP Opposes New Protests,” 136
“[Commerce Secretary] Hodges Hails State for Accepting Law,” 137
and “Many Doors Open Quietly to Negroes.” 138 On July 3, the Atlanta
Constitution published an editorial, “May Our Children Look Back
Proudly on Our Response to Lawful Duty,” in which the paper called
for replacing “the tumult and the shouting” with “trust and progress,”
and for change “without defiance or rancor.” 139 It observed: “A Congress answerable to the American people has overwhelmingly passed
this law after the longest and most careful scrutiny and debate. A
Southern President understanding of the region’s difficulties now becomes the law’s executor and he asks us to comply.” 140

131. Quick, supra note 23, at 662.
132. Ira Michael Heyman, Civil Rights 1964 Term: Responses to Direct Action, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 159, 163.
133. Nimmer, supra note 129, at 1394.
134. Bill Shipp, U.S. Responding Well to Rights Law, Says a Pleased President, ATLANTA
CONST., July 4, 1964, at 1.
135. Ted Simmons, Comply in Peace, Both Races Urge, ATLANTA CONST., July 3, 1964, at 1.
136. Bill Shipp, Pleased by Rights Compliance, NAACP Opposes New Protests, ATLANTA
CONST., July 11, 1964, at 3.
137. Sam Hopkins, Hodges Hails State for Accepting Law, ATLANTA CONST., July 9, 1964, at
1.
138. Associated Press, Many Doors Open Quietly to Negroes, ATLANTA CONST., July 4, 1964,
at 2 .
139. May Our Children Look Back Proudly on Our Response to Lawful Duty, ATLANTA CONST.,
July 3, 1964, at 4.
140. Id.
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5. The Commerce Power, Mobility, and Quantitative and Qualitative
Harms
In reasoning that Title II is a proper exercise of Congress’s power
to regulate interstate commerce, the Court hearkened back to the
expansive account of the commerce power elaborated in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 141 where Chief Justice John Marshall stated that the power was
as broad as commerce itself, which included “every species of commercial intercourse.” 142 The “test” for the proper exercise of power
by Congress is whether the activity to be regulated as commerce “concerns more States than one” and “has a real and substantial relation to
the national interest.” 143
In concluding that the Act was within Congress’s commerce
power, the Court also stressed the relevance of the changed economic
and social conditions in contemporary society: “the fact that certain
kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in
interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the
commerce power is not necessarily dispositive of the same question
today.” 144 In 1875, when Congress passed the earlier Act, the Court
observed:
Our populace had not reached its present mobility, nor were
facilities, goods and services circulating as readily in interstate commerce as they are today. . . . The sheer increase in
volume of interstate traffic alone would give discriminatory
practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact upon the
Nation’s commerce than such practices had on the economy
of another day. 145
This attention to the changing nature of the economy comes up later
in cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees, in explaining the rationale
behind a broad definition of public accommodation. 146
The changing nature of the economy in a more mobile society
also featured in explaining the burden posed by race-based discrimination in access to accommodations. The record included testimony
pertaining to:

141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
142. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 254–55 (1964) (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193–94) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 251.
145. Id.
146. See infra Part IV.
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the fact that our people have become increasingly mobile . . .; that Negroes in particular have been the subject of
discrimination in transient accommodation, having to travel
great distances to secure the same; that often they have been
unable to obtain accommodations and have had to call upon
friends to put them up overnight . . . and that these conditions had become so acute as to require the listing of available lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook which was itself “dramatic testimony to the difficulties” Negroes encounencounter in travel. 147
This testimony in Heart of Atlanta Motel provided a compelling
example of a serious burden on travel. Moreover, the practices were
“nationwide.” Here the Court summarized testimony by the Under
Secretary of Commerce about the “qualitative” and “quantitative” impact on Negroes’ ability to travel interstate:
The former [“qualitative”] was the obvious impairment of the
Negro traveler’s pleasure and convenience that resulted
when he continually was uncertain of finding lodging. As
for the latter [“quantitative”], there was evidence that this
uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro community. 148
This issue of the magnitude of the burdens that discrimination
imposes is relevant to current discussions about whether there should
be a “moral marketplace” such that government should not compel
businesses to serve customers to whom they object on moral grounds
(for example, a photographer who does not wish to photograph a civil union ceremony or same-sex wedding). 149 Douglas Laycock makes a
comparative harm argument: “requiring a merchant to perform services that violate his deeply held moral commitments is far more serious, different in kind and not just in degree” than the “mere inconvenience” to a same-sex couple of “having to get the same service
from another provider nearby.” 150 However, if so many merchants in
a particular community refused service to same-sex couples that such
couples would face a “significant hardship,” then “the merchant’s
right to moral integrity is outweighed by the same-sex couples’ right
147. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252–53 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 253.
149. See, e.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING
THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 2–3, 303–05 (2010).
150. Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 189–98 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
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to live in the community in accordance with their moral commitments.” 151
So, too, Congress’s identification of a “nationwide” problem is relevant to subsequent debates within the Court over whether a problem that Congress addressed was “truly national” or “purely local.” 152
6. Congress May Legislate Against Moral Wrongs
Another significant feature of the Court’s opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel with continuing relevance is its statement that legislating
against moral wrongs is a proper governmental end pursued through
antidiscrimination laws. In other words, race discrimination is a moral wrong and Congress may reach it through the commerce power. 153
The relationship between commercial and moral wrongs arose in oral
argument. When the Solicitor General stated that Title II was “addressed to a commercial problem of grave national significance,” Justice Goldberg pressed him: “Only commercial, Mr. Solicitor General?
Isn’t there [a] moral problem, also?” 154 In response, Cox said he
wished to and would “emphasize repeatedly in [his] argument that
Title II is addressed to a grave commercial problem.” However, he
also invoked the Nation’s conscience:
Nor should we forget, Mr. Justice Goldberg, that Congress
in addressing itself to that commercial problem was also
keeping faith with the problems [sic] declared by the Continental Congress that all men are created equal.
The failure to keep that promise lay heavy on the conscience of the entire nation, North as well as South, East as
well as West. 155
When pressed by Justice Harlan on the statement in the United
States’s brief that “we state our case on the commerce clause,” Cox returned to the idea of a commercial problem. He stated that the
record of the impact on commerce was made, and “that the impact of
these disturbances arising out of racial discrimination was not merely
151. Id. at 199 (discussing with approval Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 150, at 77, 93–102).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 316–341.
153. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256–57 (explaining that the fact that Congress
has exercised its commerce power to regulate moral wrongs such as gambling, misbranding of drugs, and racial discrimination, and the fact that Congress was also legislating
against moral wrongs does not make such use of its commerce power any less valid).
154. Excerpts from Rights Cases Argument, supra note 64.
155. Id. Mr. Cox probably intended to use the term “promise” and instead used the
term “problems.”
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social and moral. Nobody denies that aspect of it. But that it was national and commercial.” 156
In its opinion, the Court observed that Congress has often regulated commerce to reach activities that are “moral wrongs,” such as the
white-slave traffic, deceptive trade practices, and criminal enterprises. 157 The Court stated:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many
of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. . . . But
that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence
of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on
commercial intercourse. . . . Congress was not restricted by
the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral
and social wrong. 158
Some Justices—like some lawmakers—believed, nonetheless, that
this focus on “obstructions” of commerce obscured the problem of
obstruction of equal citizenship. 159
7. Property and Liberty Rights to Discriminate? Lessons from State
Laws
Another notable feature of the Court’s opinion is its deployment
of the relationship between state and federal public accommodations
law in disposing of the motel owner’s claim that the Civil Rights Act
deprived him of liberty and property under the Fifth Amendment. 160
The Court rejected the appellant’s claim briskly. It applied a rational
basis test, saying that if “Congress had a rational basis for finding that
racial discrimination by motels affected commerce,” and if it used reasonable and appropriate means to eliminate that evil, then “appellant
has no ‘right’ to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental
regulation.” 161 In observing that public accommodations laws are not
“novel,” the Court noted that thirty-two states “now have it on their
books either by statute or executive order,” as do many cities. Some
laws “go back fourscore years.” 162 Indeed, the Court read the Civil
156. Id.
157. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256–57.
158. Id. at 257.
159. See infra Part II.D (discussing Justice Douglas’s concurrence); infra Part II.E (discussing Justice Goldberg’s concurrence); see also infra Part III (discussing the competing
appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment in congressional consideration of Title II).
160. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258–61.
161. Id. at 258–59.
162. Id. at 259.
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Rights Cases as “[p]erhaps the first such holding” that these state laws
“do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”: Justice Bradley “inferentially found that innkeepers, ‘by the
laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent
of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them.’” 163 The state laws
have survived constitutional challenge, and, “in some cases the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clause objections have been specifically
discarded in this Court.” 164 The Court concluded: “As a result the
constitutionality of such state statutes stands unquestioned.” 165
Pertinent here is how states enacted public accommodations laws
even in the absence of active federal lawmaking in the area. Prior to
the 1875 Act, only three states had statutes barring racial discrimination in public accommodations, but after the Civil Rights Cases, “states
took the initiative,” with eighteen states having such laws by 1900, 166
and thirty-two by the time the Court heard the motel’s challenge. 167
However, strict judicial construction of these laws, often in the face of
assertions that enforcement would infringe common law property
rights, blunted their force, and some laws had fallen into disuse. 168
Further, when Title II was passed, no southern states had statutes barring racial discrimination in public accommodations and some state
and local laws still compelled segregation. 169 As I discuss in Part IV, in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court reiterates the role of state initiative protecting against discrimination in public accommodations in
the absence of federal law.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 259–60 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
Id. at 260 (citing Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34 n.12 (1948)).
Id.
Robert R. Bebermeyer, Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 19 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 456, 464 (1965).
167. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260.
168. Bebermeyer, supra note 166, at 265 (observing that “[i]n spite of the constitutionality of the state public accommodations statutes, many of the acts have fallen into disuse
and strict construction by the state courts has severely limited their effectiveness” (footnote
omitted)). For a thorough analysis of the history of these state laws and the changing interpretation of the common law obligations of innkeepers with the advent of Jim Crow
laws, see Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
169. See Bebermeyer, supra note 166, at 464 n.66 (listing all state antidiscrimination laws
in place when Congress passed Title II, none of which is a southern state law). For a discussion of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s testimony on the effects of state and local
laws that required segregation, see infra Part III.A.
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8. The Harms and Benefits of Antidiscrimination Laws
Although Rolleston alleged $11 million in damages (in the event
his motel had to comply with the law), contending desegregation
would ruin his business, reputation, and goodwill, the Court found it
“doubtful if in the long run appellant will suffer economic loss as a result of the Act. Experience is to the contrary where discrimination is
completely obliterated as to all public accommodations.” 170 The
Court’s reference to experience to the contrary echoes contemporaneous commentaries on Title II making the economic argument that
ending segregation will help local economies by increasing the flow of
tourist dollars into cities. 171 But the Court also explained that if there
was some harm as a result of the application of the Civil Rights Act, it
was irrelevant to the Act’s constitutionality:
But whether [appellant will suffer economic loss in the long
run] is of no consequence since this Court has specifically
held that the fact that a “member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others . . .
has never been a barrier” to such legislation. . . . Likewise in
a long line of cases this Court has rejected the claim that the
prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations interferes with personal liberty. 172
These twin arguments that antidiscrimination laws do not harm
those subject to them and that, in any case, harm is constitutionally
permissible recur in newer generations of public accommodations
controversies, although the asserted injuries are not to property but to
associational and religious freedom. 173
C. Justice Black’s Concurrence: Don’t Leave Out the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments
In his concurring opinion, Justice Black reiterated that there was
an “ample basis” for Congress’s conclusions about the impact of dis-

170. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260.
171. Quick, supra note 23, at 664 (stating that “the Dallas Chamber of Commerce reported in 1963 that integration in that city has added eight to ten million dollars in convention business,” and that “[a]fter Atlanta, Georgia, hotels announced an open door policy with respect to race, three conventions promising 3,000 delegates committed their
respective organizations to meet in that city”).
172. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260–61 (alterations in both) (quoting Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944)). The Court summarily rejected the appellant’s
claim that the Civil Rights Act “is a taking of property without just compensation.” Id. at
261.
173. See infra Part IV.
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crimination in interstate commerce. 174 Like the majority, he invoked
Chief Justice Marshall’s expansive interpretation of “commerce,” although he turns not to Gibbons but to the “standard” set forth in
M’Culloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 175 He
also stressed that upholding the law does not “uproot and throw into
the discard” the distinction between “purely local” activity and that
which affects the “national interest,” given the aggregate effects of
many local events of discrimination. 176
In contrast to the majority, he expressly invoked the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments as additional sources of Congress’s legitimate power:
In view of the Commerce Clause it is not possible to deny
that the aim of protecting interstate commerce from undue
burdens is a legitimate end. In view of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, it is not possible to deny
that the aim of protecting Negroes from discrimination is also a legitimate end. 177
He also found the means adopted appropriate and consistent with
“both [the] letter and spirit” of the Constitution. 178 As to the motel’s
assertion that Title II violates the Thirteenth Amendment, Justice
Black merely stated in a footnote that such an argument “is so insubstantial that it requires no further discussion.” 179
D. Justice Douglas’s Concurrence: How to Resolve the Evident Clash of
Rights
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas extensively discussed
the flaws in the appellant’s assertion of property rights as a basis to
defeat Title II. His analysis is instructive for contemporary clashes of

174. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 276 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. at 275.
177. Id. at 276.
178. Recall that in refusing to stay the lower court’s order, Justice Black referred to his
belief that Congress had “broad grants of power” in both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment sufficient to “control commerce among the states and to enforce
the 14th amendment’s policy against racial discrimination.” Black Upholds Rights Law, supra
note 44.
179. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 278 n.12.
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rights, for example, when rights to freedom of association and religion are in evident tension with rights to free and equal citizenship. 180
His concurrence is also notable for his “reluctance” to allow the
Court’s decision “to rest solely on the Commerce Clause,” rather than
on the legislative power contained in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 181 He stressed the human rights dimension of the case:
My reluctance is . . . due to . . . my belief that the right of
people to be free of state action that discriminates against
them because of race, like the “right of persons to move
freely from State to State,” . . . “occupies a more protected
position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.” 182
Justice Douglas also contended that “[a] decision based on the
Fourteenth Amendment would have a more settling effect,” avoiding
the need for “litigation over whether a particular restaurant or inn is
within the commerce definitions of the Act or whether a particular
customer is an interstate traveler.” Justice Douglas would have construed the Act to “apply to all customers in all the enumerated places
of public accommodation,” a construction that “would put an end to
all obstructionist strategies and finally close one door on a bitter
183
Commentary by legal scholars at the
chapter in American history.”
time of the decision found unpersuasive Justice Douglas’s claim that a
Fourteenth Amendment holding would “have a more settling effect,”
detailing the likely extensive judicial involvement and rulemaking
such a holding would necessitate. 184
180. See infra Part IV.
181. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279–80 (Douglas, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 279 (Douglas, J. concurring) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
183. Id. at 280. Justice Douglas reiterated that a decision based on the Fourteenth
Amendment would “put[] an end to all obstructionist strategies and allowing every person—whatever his race, creed, or color—to patronize all places of public accommodation
without discrimination whether he travels interstate or intrastate.” Id. at 286.
184. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 129–31
(1965) (arguing that “[a] holding based on the fourteenth amendment would pose questions as to the scope of the newly declared right,” such as which enterprises were included
and on what judicial criterion, and would require generating “a new set of constitutional
standards governing private conduct covered by the amendment”); Heyman, supra note
132, at 163–64 (finding Justice Douglas’s opinion “more satisfactory” than the majority’s in
being “verbally more direct,” but concluding that the Court, in upholding the Act based
on Congress’s commerce power, “wisely” avoided the Fourteenth Amendment issue and
“gratuitously fashion[ed] the detailed rules that are needed to distinguish public from private accommodations”); Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Book Review, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 234, 236
(1966) (reviewing MILTON R. KONVITZ, EXPANDING LIBERTIES—FREEDOM’S GAINS IN
POSTWAR AMERICA (1966)) (noting that “Konvitz berates the Court” for upholding the Civ-
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For Justice Douglas, the relevant obstruction was not to commerce but to African-Americans’ full realization of the rights of citizenship. He appreciated the strategic point that, in 1964, Congress
relied on its commerce power to avoid “what was thought to be the
obstacle of the Civil Rights Cases.” 185 But Justice Douglas emphasized
that the record made it “clear that the objectives of the Fourteenth
Amendment were by no means ignored.” 186 He illustrated with excerpts from the Senate Report about the clash of rights, or perhaps
better, the improper assertion of rights claims to defeat public accommodations legislation. 187 Some of the reasoning in that Report—
and his use of it—is instructive with respect to more contemporary objections to public accommodations laws.
One pertinent theme in the Senate Report is its articulation of
the purposes of private property as an institution and how to address
the clash of rights and values when one asserts property rights (as
means to liberty and freedom) to defeat the freedom and liberty of
others. Just as the Report notes the function of private property as a
buffer against state power (and being at the mercy of others), accounts of freedom of association stress a similar buffering function
(for example, as articulated in Roberts). 188 But, as this passage from
the Report makes clear, this liberty-enhancing function of property
does not translate into an absolute right that hinders the liberty of
others:
Does the owner of private property devoted to use as a public establishment enjoy a property right to refuse to deal with
any member of the public because of that member’s race, religion, or national origin? . . . [T]he English common law
answered this question in the negative. It reasoned that one
who employed his private property for purposes of commercial gain by
offering goods or services to the public must stick to his bargain. It
is to be remembered that the right of the private property

il Rights Act under the Commerce Clause, rather than the “fourteenth amendment route,
suggested by Justices Douglas and Goldberg,” but argues there is “little to support Douglas’s assertion that” such a ruling would have a “more settling effect” and instead that there
is a “strong probability” it “might have opened the act to recurring litigation in the manner of desegregation itself in the years when the Court was compelled to depend entirely
on its own inventiveness and resources”).
185. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., concurring).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 284–86 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23).
188. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–619 (1984) (“[W]e have noted
that certain kinds of personal bonds . . . foster diversity and act as critical buffers between
the individual and the power of the State.” (citations omitted)).
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owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never claimed
when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property
owner from dealing with persons of a particular race. Nor
were such laws ever struck down as an infringement upon
this supposed right of the property owner.
But there are stronger and more persuasive reasons for
not allowing concepts of private property to defeat public
accommodations law. The institution of private property exists for the purpose of enhancing the individual freedom and
liberty of human beings. This institution assures that the individual need not be at the mercy of others, including government, in order to earn a livelihood and prosper from his
individual efforts. Private property provides the individual
with something of value that will serve him well in obtaining
what he desires or requires in his daily life.
Is this time honored means to freedom and liberty now
to be twisted so as to defeat individual freedom and liberty?
189

The Report (quoted by Justice Douglas) explained that restrictions on private property (including the abolition of slavery) ensure
that it serves its liberty-enhancing end:
Certainly denial of a right to discriminate or segregate by
race or religion would not weaken the attributes of private
property that make it an effective means of obtaining individual freedom. In fact, in order to assure that the institution of private property serves the end of individual freedom
and liberty it has been restricted in many instances. The
most striking example of this is the abolition of slavery.
Slaves were treated as items of private property, yet surely no
man dedicated to the cause of individual freedom could
contend that individual freedom and liberty suffered by
emancipation of the slaves. 190
In these passages from the Senate Report, readers can find important precursors or parallels to more contemporary arguments
about how antidiscrimination laws advance freedom and American

189. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 284–86 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23) (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 285 (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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ideals. There is also a parallel to arguments about the “bargain” one
makes in entering the realm of business or dealing with the public. 191
The Senate Report goes on to observe that zoning laws put greater restrictions upon private property rights than do public accommodations laws. Zoning laws are necessary, and their restrictions do not
lessen the freedom-enhancing aspects of property. To the contrary,
“[s]uch laws and regulations restricting private property are necessary
so that human beings may develop their communities in a reasonable
and peaceful manner. Surely the presence of such restrictions does
not detract from the role of private property in securing individual liberty and freedom.” 192
These claims, or predictions, about legal restrictions on property
are precursors to arguments in a newer generation of antidiscrimination cases that the basic goods protected by freedom of association
are not injured—or not injured to a constitutionally troubling degree—by public accommodations laws requiring nondiscrimination in
membership or services. 193 Here, the argument is that private property can still secure liberty and freedom for the right-holder, even if
there are limits on the right.
The Senate Report is reminiscent of political liberalism’s concept
of the mutual adjustment of equal basic liberties. 194 Thus, if eliminating racial discrimination is a prerequisite for everyone having freedom, then government legitimately bars such discrimination. Rather
than accepting the criticism that antidiscrimination laws pursue the
equal citizenship of some at the expense of the liberty or freedom of
others, the Report envisions the necessary adjustment of freedoms
and liberties so all can have them. 195 Title II expresses the entitlement of “all persons” to “full and equal enjoyment” of public accommodations. 196 In the following passage, the Report is evocative of lib-

191. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633–635 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (drawing distinction between mostly “expressive” and mostly “commercial associations” and arguing: “An association must choose its market. Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy
if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”).
192. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23).
193. See infra Part III.
194. For an overview of this concept, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 295–99
(1993).
195. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 288 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22–23).
196. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006)).
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eral theorist John Rawls’s notion of adjusting basic liberties to secure
the full value of free and equal citizenship: 197
Nor can it be reasonably argued that racial or religious discrimination is a vital factor in the ability of private property
to constitute an effective vehicle for assuring personal freedom. . . . The Pledge of this Nation is to secure freedom for
every individual; that pledge will be furthered by elimination
of such practices. 198
The above quote speaks, in effect, about appropriate limitations
on how we conceive of rights, such as the scope of the constitutionally
protected right to property. Property rights may be subject to limitations if they impinge on the rights of others, such as the right to be
free from discrimination in access to the goods and services offered by
businesses. As property scholar Joseph Singer argues, this is an appropriate legal baseline about property rights in a free and democratic society. 199 Of course, as I mention below, critics of Title II emphatically rejected this notion of appropriate limitations on property
rights. As I mention in Part III, a salient question in subsequent generations of public accommodations cases is how to define the scope of
freedom of expressive association.
E. Justice Goldberg’s Concurrence: “The Vindication of Human Dignity
and Not Mere Economics”
Dignity is the basic theme of Justice Goldberg’s concurrence.
Congress, he agreed, had power under the Commerce Clause to enact
the law, but dignity was the law’s primary purpose: “The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . is the vindication of human
200
In support, Justice Goldberg
dignity and not mere economics.”
quoted the Senate Commerce Committee:
The primary purpose of . . . [the Civil Rights Act], then, is to
solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents,
197. RAWLS, supra note 194, at 295–99, 358–59.
198. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22 (quoted by Justice Douglas at 379 U.S. at
373).
199. See Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American Property Law, 1
ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 83, 84 (2011) [hereinafter Singer, The AntiApartheid Principle] (“United States law does and should recognize a foundational antiapartheid principle that puts out of bounds market conduct that deprives individuals of
equal opportunities because of their race.”).
200. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration,
and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is
told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color. It is equally the inability to explain to a child that regardless of education, civility, courtesy, and morality he will be denied the right to enjoy equal
treatment, even though he be a citizen of the United States
and may well be called upon to lay down his life to assure
this Nation continues. 201
This emphasis by Congress on dignity resonates with language in
later public accommodations cases (such as Roberts’ cite to the majority’s reference to “dignity” as the primary legislative objective). Contemporaneous commentators applauded Justice Goldberg’s focus
upon dignity. 202 One review of the Court’s civil rights decisions for
the term praised Goldberg’s themes as “more satisfactory than the
majority’s in that they are verbally more direct” in getting at what is
not “mainly a problem of economics”: “The indignity, humiliation,
and frustration of Negroes resulting from such discrimination are
closer to the mark” than the fact that they may be discouraged from
taking trips. 203
The Report’s striking use of the term “public,” in the passage
quoted by Justice Goldberg, also defies a simple public/private division. The Report refers to being told a person is “unacceptable as a
member of the public.” 204 The public realm, in this account, includes
spaces in civil society where people interact, go to the movies, or purchase food. The public/private line is blurred in the sense that the
“public” space is not equated with being a governmental space. 205 It is
public in the sense that an event is “open to the public” or “members
of the public” are invited to attend. 206
201. Id. at 291–92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alterations in both) (quoting S. REP. NO.
88-872, supra note 4, at 16).
202. In a 1965 profile of Justice Goldberg, Stephen Breyer, a former law clerk to Justice
Goldberg and current Supreme Court Justice, cited this language about dignity as indicative that Justice Goldberg “has always instinctively seen the law ‘as an opportunity to help
people obtain social justice’—to aid them in achieving a more productive and civilized existence.” Stephen G. Breyer, Mr. Justice Goldberg, 12 FED. BAR NEWS 379 (1965) (quoting
Judge Bazelon).
203. Heymann, supra note 132, at 163.
204. See supra text accompanying note 201.
205. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(b), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)).
206. “The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private club or other establishment
not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment
are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of
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Justice Goldberg stressed the relationship between public accommodations law and the meaning of community membership. 207 He
referred to an earlier concurrence in which he articulated his conviction that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees to all
Americans the constitutional right ‘to be treated as equal members of
the community with respect to public accommodations,’ and that
‘Congress [has] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or under the Commerce Clause . . . to implement the rights protected
by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” 208
F. Reactions in the Press to the Court’s Ruling
The Court released its unanimous opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel concurrently with its unanimous opinion in the Ollie’s Barbeque
case, McClung v. Katzenbach, and its 5-to-4 opinion abating the preTitle II sit-in convictions, Hamm v. City of Rock Hill. Press reaction, not
surprisingly, conjoined the Court’s upholding of Title II with its “killing” the convictions and highlighted the contrast between the Court
“acting with rare unanimity” in the first two cases and dividing 5-to-4
on the fate of the sit-in convictions. 209 The Atlanta Constitution’s headline read: “Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here” and
continued: “Tells States to Kill All Sit-In Cases.” 210 Some northern
and southern newspapers ran a picture of Moreton Rolleston hearing
the news by telephone, with a caption that he was “not surprised” by
the Court’s decision. 211 Some featured pictures of Ollie McClung Sr.
or of the Heart of Atlanta Motel. 212 Some quoted and even headlined
Rolleston’s reaction and prediction: “It makes possible a socialistic
subsection (b) of this section.” § 201(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)). For a list of
the establishments which are considered “public” under the Act, see § 201(b) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)).
207. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between public and private space
and how public accommodations laws had a predicate in a communitarian and corporatist
strand of Anglo-American law protecting travelers, see A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers,
Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 L. & HIST.
REV. 53 (2005).
208. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 293 (1964) (quoting
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 317 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
209. Andrew Glass, High Court Upholds New Rights Law, Frees All Sit-Ins, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 15, 1964, at 1; High Court Upholds Accommodations Law, Kills Early Sit-in Cases, (Louisville) COURIER-J., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1.
210. Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here—Tells States To Kill All Sit-in Cases,
ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10.
211. Ted Lippman, Supreme Court Upholds Rights Law in Case Here—Dismisses Appeal by Motel, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10.
212. Jerry T. Baulch, High Court Ruling Backs Rights Law, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15,
1964, at 1 (photo of Ollie McClung Sr. “At Work”).
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state and eventual dictatorship. This is a sad day for the cause of individual freedom.” 213
The press reported President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s official
statement expressing hope for continuing and increasing “reasonable
and responsible acceptance” of the Civil Rights Act “now that the Supreme Court also has ruled” and praising the South for accepting the
Act, despite initial opposition:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was proposed by Two Presidents. It was overwhelmingly adopted by Congress and now
the constitutionality of its public accommodations section
has been upheld by a unanimous vote of the Supreme
Court.
The nation has spoken with a single voice on the question of equal rights and equal opportunity.
I have been heartened by the spirit with which the
people of the south have accepted the act even though many
were opposed to its passage. 214
President Johnson, in this statement, links the unanimity of the
Court to the unified—“single”—voice of the nation. Civil rights leaders stressed the role of the many sit-ins throughout the South as a catalyst for speaking with this national voice and interpreted the Court’s
opinion as vindicating those efforts. 215 Thus, John Lewis, then a leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, hailed the
Court’s ruling as “the landmark in the struggle for complete social,
economic and political equality for all Americans,” stating that it “vindicated the thousands of demonstrators who made the civil rights bill
not only possible but imperative.” 216 The press quoted Roy Wilkins,
executive secretary of the NAACP, as stating that the Court “recognized the justification for the acts of thousands of young people who
exercised their moral right to equal service even before the [civil
rights] law was passed.” 217 Thus, although reading Heart of Atlanta Mo213. Warns Court Opens Door to Socialist U.S., CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1964, at 2; “Socialistic
State” Foreseen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1964, at 48; see also Achsah Posey, His Fight Is Over, Motel
Man Says, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 1, 10.
214. LBJ Hails Acceptance—Praises Southern Reaction to Law, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD,
Dec. 15, 1964, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Negro Leaders Jubilant Over Rights Decision, Await Compliance, ALA. J., Dec. 15, 1964, at
10.
216. Id. The reference here to “social equality” is striking, given Justice Harlan’s insistence in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases that access to public accommodations was
about civil rights, not social rights or compelled social intercourse. See supra text accompanying notes 85–95.
217. Warns Court Opens Door to Socialist U.S., supra note 213 (alterations in the original).
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tel as an isolated text does not reveal this fuller story of struggle and
transformation, the above quotes suggest that a significant legacy of
the case is the perception that, in upholding Title II, the Court
weighed in favorably on and gave added legitimacy to this momentous
national development.
President Johnson might have been heartened by the mayor of
Atlanta’s statement that many states had “had public accommodations
laws for many years,” and that “Congress had the full right to take the
same steps to eliminate gross discrimination against individuals on an
interstate basis,” and by the president of the Atlanta Restaurant Association expressing confidence “that our patrons, customers and
friends will understand this position” and urging association members
to comply. 218 Georgia Governor Carl Sanders, however, reiterated
that his opposition to the public accommodations law was “well
known and a matter of record” (including his Congressional testimony); rather than echoing President Johnson’s hopes, he stated: “The
court has acted now, and there is no need for further comment by
me.” 219 Openly critical of the Court and urging resistance, Governor
George Wallace, in neighboring Alabama, called the decision “a staggering blow to the free enterprise system and the rights of private
property owners.” 220 Wallace erroneously referred back to the Court’s
earlier decision in the Civil Rights Cases as invalidating “such an act
under the commerce clause,” and urged: “Despite this setback there
should be continuing resistance to such attacks on the system that has
made this nation great and strong.” 221
Editorials in some southern newspapers expressed worry about
Congress’s expansive use of the commerce power and the Supreme
Court’s “edict,” which “puts virtually no limit on what can be called
‘interstate commerce’ or on the power of congress to regulate it.” 222
For example, taking a different tone than its op-ed on the signing of
Title II, the Atlanta Constitution deemed the ruling “no surprise,” calling it “another step in the steady onward march of Federal dominion
218. Posey, supra note 213.
219. Id.
220. John Williams, ‘Rough Blow’ Wallace Says of Decision, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec.
15, 1964, at 1.
221. Id. In contrast to Wallace’s characterization, press analysis noting the Court’s
change over the last century—from Dred Scott to its 1964 opinions—accurately reported
that the Commerce Clause was not at issue in the earlier public accommodations law. It
also noted that the Court’s reversal “is a reflection of the change in attitude in this country
toward Negroes.” James Marlow, 5 Decisions Stand Out in Civil Rights History, ALA. J., Dec.
16, 1964, at 10.
222. David Lawrence, Fateful Day in History, ALA. J., Dec. 16, 1964, at 4.
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over lives of the people.” It counseled that “it is a ruling which we
must live with. Time may bring changes, but certainly not in the foreseeable future.” 223 The Montgomery Advertiser similarly combined resignation to living with the Civil Rights Act with a warning of its severe
deprivation of “sacred” property rights:
It is pointless now to argue whether the ruling was good
law or bad law: the finding will rule the country in this
realm. It is one of the most consequential nullifications of
property rights in the history of the court . . . .
....
It may be argued that the throttling of a restaurant’s
right to choose its clientele or a department store to reject a
job applicant are benign in purpose. Even if you account
the law’s purpose as benevolent, you have to concede that it
is a grand scale deprivation of property rights previously
held sacred in this country. 224
Similarly, the Birmingham News interpreted the unanimity of the
Court as probably meaning there was “no real prospect of judicial
overturning of any other sections in the new act,” even as it observed
that “the Court has joined Congress in protecting some rights at the
specific expense of rights of others;” it warned that the decision may
pose a “grave danger” as a precedent for using government power “to
act further against private enterprise practices.” 225
To return to Rolleston himself: the hotel owner remarked that
the “decision nullifies the rights and principles which the Constitution was designed to perpetuate” and “opens the frightful door to unlimited power of a centralized government in Washington, in which
the individual citizens and his [sic] personal liberty are of no importance.” 226 This statement, perhaps unwittingly, invites attention to
flaws with the original constitutional scheme, which perpetuated certain forms of inequality and nullified the very legal status and rights of
African-Americans. Moreover, all these reactions evince a more abso223. No Surprise Ruling, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1964, at 4.
224. More to Come, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1964, at 4. In one op-ed, the author criticized the Court’s “edict” for “chang[ing] the whole constitutional system overnight,” instead of the nation proceeding by constitutional amendment, and concluded: “It
remains to be seen whether this method of governing the United States will be accepted in
the long run by the people, and whether they will submit to changes of such far-reaching
character in American life without the usual constitutional processes being observed.”
Lawrence, supra note 222.
225. Opinion of the Week: At Home and Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1964, at E9 (excerpting the BIRMINGHAM NEWS).
226. Id. (quoting Moreton Rolleston).
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lute conception of property rights, a conception rejected in the Senate Report, and, implicitly, in Title II.
Another theme in the press’s reaction to the Court’s ruling in
Heart of Atlanta Motel and its companion cases is that it is time to move
on to the next challenges in ending separate but equal and securing
equality. Thus, the New York Times cautioned that the decisions were a
“major step,” but would “by no means . . . eliminate all racial problems,” for example, integration in the North, where “discrimination
in public accommodations has long been outlawed.” 227 It admonished:
But the issue no longer is a question of legality. The primary
concern now is not resistance to the law but the Negro’s poverty and inadequate education. These remaining problems
can be solved only through massive efforts to deal with de
facto school segregation and discrimination in jobs and
housing, which have been the causes of racial unrest in the
North all along. 228
Similarly, a “Negro” civil rights lawyer, Donald L. Hollowell,
commented: “The decision is most important and extremely gratifying . . . [and now] we can all . . . turn our concerted attention to promoting the general welfare and other basic needs such as jobs, housing and education.” 229 Legal commentators, too, expressed similar
conviction about the need for “cause seekers” to move on from the
era of “civil disobedience and the beatings related to public accommodations” to remaining challenges, addressed by other parts of the
Civil Rights Act, such as the “more fertile areas” of “voting rights, employment and housing.” 230
For critics of the Civil Rights Act, by contrast, what lay ahead was
more encroachments on private rights. Looking ahead to implementing the Act’s provisions barring discrimination against a job applicant
based on race or creed, one op-ed warned this was “a hard blow at an
employer’s right to run his own business according to his own lights
and prejudices.” 231 Maddox himself rode widespread public reaction
against integration to victory as governor of Georgia. It is a common
observation that President Johnson recognized his support for the

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

The Nation: Court on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1964, at E2.
Id.
Opinion of the Week: At Home and Abroad, supra note 225 (alteration in original).
Quick, supra note 23, at 709.
More to Come, supra note 224.
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Civil Rights Act would cost the Democratic Party the South “for a long
time to come.” 232
III. THE COMPETING APPEALS TO THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TITLE II
Reading Heart of Atlanta Motel in isolation from the larger context
of congressional consideration of what became Title II could lead the
reader to catch only a glimpse of the role the Thirteenth Amendment
played in the 1964 public accommodations law. The goal of this Part
is to illustrate how appeals to the Thirteenth Amendment featured
both in arguments supporting the bill and opposing it. Two distinct
understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment’s relevance were at
work: to empower Congress to address the intolerable discrimination
African-Americans still experienced in everyday life, nearly 100 years
after emancipation, and (as in Rolleston’s argument) to bar Congress
from compelling “private” businesses to serve customers they did not
wish to serve. Given space constraints, I do not attempt an exhaustive
look, but focus on two sources: the arguments made by the U.S. Attorney General’s office in support of the public accommodations law
and any references to the Thirteenth Amendment made in the Senate
Report on S. 1732, 233 the public accommodations bill, and the various
Individual Views included with it. 234 That examination reveals that
proponents of the bill shared a concern to remedy what they viewed
as a significant moral problem, but some were more pragmatic in
looking for a constitutional hook (commerce) that would avoid the
232. SUSAN DUDLEY GOLD, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 115 (2011) (“On the night
after signing the civil rights bill, President Johnson sadly predicted the political ramifications of the act. ‘I think we just delivered the South to the Republican party for a long
time to come,’ Johnson told his press adviser, Bill Moyers.” “[H]is words proved true” because even though he won the 1964 election “in a landslide,” his opponent, Senator Barry
Goldwater, “received support from the five states of the Deep South (Louisiana, Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina)” and “in the years that followed, the South consistently voted for Republicans for president”). For contemporary press reports of the
1964 presidential election outcome, see Tom Wicker, Johnson’s Plurality Sets Record; Many
Democrats Gain by Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1964, at 1 (reporting that “[o]nly in a belt of
five states across the Deep South could Mr. Goldwater claim victory for his brand of conservatism. In those states his victory margins were rolled up in predominantly segregationist areas”). Press coverage of Johnson’s 1964 landslide observed that “the most remarkable
percentages [in Johnson’s landslide] concerned Negro voting”: in the South, in 1956,
“President Eisenhower won 45 percent of Negroes; in 1960, Mr. Kennedy won 69 percent.
Tuesday Mr. Johnson polled 95 percent of a sizeable Southern Negro vote.” Wicker, supra,
at 21.
233. This is the Senate version of what became, after a compromise bill, Title II.
234. There was less discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment in the House Report, but I
also consider it.
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Court overturning the new law. For some lawmakers (as for Justice
Goldberg), this emphasis upon commerce failed to capture the dignity and citizenship issues at stake. I conclude this Part by examining
the rhetoric of a 2004 House Resolution commemorating the fortieth
anniversary of Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act and statements made in support. One opponent of that resolution, Rep. Ron
Paul, Republican of Texas, sounded property rights arguments similar
to those made in opposition to the act and echoed several years later
when his son (and eventual United States senator from Kentucky)
Rand Paul found himself in a political firestorm after criticizing Title
II. 235
A. Testimony by the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General
In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy advanced a pragmatic view that
discrimination in public accommodations was a national problem—
and injustice—that required a remedy, and the Commerce Clause
supplied Congress the authority to provide that remedy. 236 The Thirteenth Amendment, Kennedy remarked more than once, was also a
possible foundation for S. 1732; indeed, he stated that it “might very
well be stronger than the 14th amendment” as a basis because, by
contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not have a state action
requirement. 237 While he personally believed that the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments provided additional authority for the law,
Kennedy repeatedly observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in
the Civil Rights Cases was still “the law of the land” and that resting the
bill on the Fourteenth Amendment alone—as some senators proposed to do—would put a “heavy burden” on the bill, avoidable if
Congress used the dual hooks of commerce and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 238 Kennedy praised and indicated agreement with Justice Harlan’s dissent in that case and predicted that, given how much
had changed in the eighty years since that opinion, the Court would
likely sustain a Fourteenth Amendment basis for the law. 239 However,
235. See Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Tea Party Pick Causes Uproar on Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2010, at A1.
236. A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce:
Hearings on S. 1732 A Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 28 (1963), [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 1] (statement of the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
of the United States).
237. Id. at 74.
238. Id. at 23, 78.
239. Id. at 77–78 (noting that, in 1963, there is “more travel,” thus implicating a citizen’s
right to travel as a privilege and immunity of citizenship and also “that the shipment of
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because there was reasonable disagreement on the issue, including in
the Justice Department itself, the more prudent course was relying on
Congress’s clear authority under the Commerce Clause.
The Thirteenth Amendment was also a lodestar for Kennedy’s
testimony about why a national law was necessary to address the harms
to citizenship and personhood stemming from race-based refusals of
service and the fact that, nearly one hundred years after emancipation, blacks still experienced injustice and indignity. A few passages
from his testimony are illustrative: “With the adoption of the 13th,
14th, and 15th amendments, the American Negro was freed from slavery and made a citizen in full standing—on paper, at least. But for
most of the past hundred years we have imposed the duties of citizenship on the Negro without allowing him to enjoy the benefits.” 240
Kennedy further stated: “Plainly, when a customer is turned away
from such a place because of the color of his skin, it imposes a badge
of inferiority on that citizen which he has every right to resent.” 241
Kennedy also referenced persisting racial inequality as evidence of a
failure to realize the Thirteenth Amendment.
Strikingly, when Senator Strom Thurmond questioned Kennedy’s invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the bill
and countered, instead, that the only involuntary servitude at issue
would be that experienced by the business owner, due to the public
accommodations law, Kennedy’s answer shifted to the unfilled promises of the Thirteenth Amendment for American Negroes, nearly a
century after emancipation:
When the 13th amendment was written, it involved granting
to the Negroes all the privileges, rights, and immunities of
all the other citizens.
I think quite frankly, Senator, that there are sections of the
country where they have never received that and this is a
whole major effort. It doesn’t just go to allowing them to go
into a tavern or barbershop or store of one kind or another.
It involves that fact that they are not permitted to register or
vote in elections so they can’t change the system in their
own State. It involves the fact they have not had an adequate
education, so they can’t rise above the lowest positions. . . .
Senator, it is 1963. . . . [A]ll of this effort to keep the Negro from obtaining really a decent and reasonable life in the
goods, the movement of goods, is far different now than it was during the period of the
time of the 14th amendment,” with much more state licensing and regulation).
240. Id. at 24.
241. Id. at 18.
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United States—it is all part of a system. . . . [T]herefore,
[because] they haven’t received all their rights and privileges under the 14th amendment, . . . you could . . . argue
forcefully that under the 13th amendment that this would
be declared constitutional. I think it is a different situation
than in 1883 because we have gone 80 more years when
these practices and procedures still exist.242
The testimony of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General of
the Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice, parallels Kennedy’s in naming the Thirteenth Amendment as among the constitutional bases for the federal public accommodations bill. Indeed, Marshall referred to the Civil Rights Cases majority opinion’s belief “that
[the Thirteenth Amendment] gave Congress the power, not only to
enact legislation against the institution of slavery itself, as such, but
against the badges, the remaining badges left over from the previous
condition of servitude.” 243 He added (contrary to Justice Bradley’s
view, of course, but in keeping with Justice Harlan’s): “One of the
badges, one of the remnants of the institution of slavery, based on
race in this country was the denial of access to these places covered by
this bill [S. 1732]. So that is why I think the 13th amendment positively gives the Congress power to move in this area.” 244 However,
Marshall also—like Kennedy—stressed the pragmatic case for resting
primarily on Congress’s Commerce Clause power and the “heavy burden” Congress would put on the bill—in light of the Civil Rights Cases—if it rested solely on the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 Thus, Marshall conceded, under the 1883 case, “Congress did not have the
power under the 13th or 14th amendment to compel the proprietors
to render service to Negroes.” 246
Marshall, like Kennedy, sounded moral themes of a long overdue
remedy for intolerable racial discrimination. He observed that establishments “in business to serve the public” practice “systematized and
complete” racial discrimination, subjecting “countless members of the
public—citizens of this country guaranteed equality of treatment by
our Constitution” to “daily suffer the humiliation of being denied ser-

242. Id. at 118–19.
243. Id. at 231–32 (statement of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice).
244. Id. at 232 (insertion added).
245. On the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the law, see id. at 206, 230–31. On
the “heavy burden” point, see id. at 248.
246. Id. at 208.
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vice for no reason other than the color of their skin.” 247 Pointing to
the escalation in the number of sit-ins and demonstrations with respect to segregated facilities as evidence of “the intensity with which
millions of our citizens resent this treatment,” Marshall asserted, “no
problem is of greater immediate importance than discrimination in
places of public accommodation.” 248 Asked to defend this statement,
Marshall clarified “that the need for curing this problem goes back a
very long way,” but it was the intensification of the demonstrations—
and the support for them, along with the failure of voluntary and persuasive efforts in some localities—that made the matter so urgent. 249
When asked whether the public accommodations bill “aim[s] at the
thing which is the point of highest irritation and frustration and offense,” Marshall answered that this was “true in the places where this
kind of discrimination exists,” and that the bill “would bear very heavily upon how 18 or 19 million Americans feel they are looked upon by
their Government.” 250
Marshall combined the pragmatic concern with fashioning a bill
that could deal with the Supreme Court’s Civil Rights Cases “8-to-1 decision” with the urgent need “to deal with the substantive problems,
the substantive evil, that is causing a great deal of turmoil, and is
permitting to continue a system of injustice and racial intolerance in
this country.” 251 When senators pressed the point that the Fourteenth
Amendment was better suited to remedy bias, prejudice, and discrimination than the commerce power, Marshall reiterated the risk of relying “solely” on the Fourteenth Amendment and stated that Congress
had the power, under commerce, to deal “now” with a “very urgent”
national problem. 252 Marshall, like Kennedy, did state that the 1883
“case could be distinguished in some sense,” due to changes in the
degree of state regulation of business “and the fact that in many places these practices have been required or encouraged, not only tolerated . . . by State officials and State laws and local officials and local
ordinances.” 253

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 237–38.
Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 224.
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B. The Senate Report on S. 1732
Congress did not explicitly rely on the Thirteenth Amendment,
notwithstanding Kennedy’s comments about it as a possible foundation. The Senate Report candidly notes the “formidable obstacle to a
favorable determination” that the 1883 Supreme Court holding concerning the 1875 public accommodation law posed “[a]t the outset.” 254 Here, it mentions the Court’s rejection of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis because of the lack of state action; it does not
mention the Thirteenth Amendment ruling in the case. Noting the
“large body of legal thought” that believed the Court might reverse
that decision or distinguish it, the Report stated: “That question,
however, was not before the committee, for the instant measure is
based on the commerce clause,” which the 1883 opinion did not foreclose as a basis for a public accommodations statute. 255 It refers to
an Appendix to the Senate Report, a memorandum prepared by constitutional law scholar Paul Freund, Constitutional Bases for the Public
Accommodations Bill, which led with—and concentrated upon—
Congress’s authority to enact the law under the commerce power. 256
The memo concluded that “[t]he commerce power is clearly adequate and appropriate,” and also counseled: “No impropriety need be
felt in using the commerce clause as a response to a deep moral concern. Where social injustices occur in commercial activities the commerce power is a natural and familiar means for dealing with
them.” 257 This theme of Congress properly addressing a moral problem through the commerce power features in the Senate Report and,
as discussed in Part II, in the Court’s Heart of Atlanta Motel opinion.
With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, Freund offered some
thoughts about why the Court had not overruled the Civil Rights Cases
decision and explored what kind of rights an overruling of the cases
“would create for the courts and for Congress to enforce.” 258
The Senate Report also situates the law in the framework of
common law obligations of innkeepers and rejects (as quoted in Justice Douglas’s opinion) private property objections to the bill. Simi254. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 12.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 82–92 (Appendix, Constitutional Bases for the Public Accommodations Bill).
257. Id. at 92.
258. Id. Freund added, “The Court may be the readier to accept this basis for the legislation if a consensus is reached as to those principles by the proponents of this constitutional approach.” He concluded that it is “uncertain” whether the Supreme Court would
sustain the legislation under that basis “because of the necessity to find principles of inclusion and exclusion in opening up a new class of constitutional claims against private enterprises.” Id.

McClainFinalBookProof-NEW

2011]

12/7/2011 10:17 AM

THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC.

129

larly, Freund deflects objections rooted in property and associational
rights: “There is no serious question of the right of association or of
property or of privacy as a barrier to the legislation, applicable as it is
to commercial places of public accommodation.” 259
The Report does not explicitly mention the Thirteenth Amendment. It clearly treats the new public accommodations law, however,
as affording a long-overdue remedy. The Senate Report looks back to
the 1875 Act and to the recommendations, made in the 1947 Report
of President Harry S. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights titled To
Secure Those Rights, that states enact public accommodations laws (and
better enforce the ones they have). It states: “This bill, then, is the
second attempt to achieve Federal legislation and the third time equal
access to public accommodations has been recommended as a national goal.” 260 Appropriately, then, the theme of the unfinished
business of eradicating the legacy of slavery is very strong, as is its implicit invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s broad aim of equal
civil liberties. 261
C. Explicit Reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment to Support the Public
Accommodations Bill: Senator Prouty’s Individual Views
Accompanying the Senate Report were the individual views of
several senators. An impassioned statement offering the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments as a better foundation than the commerce power featured in the individual views of Senator Winston L.
Prouty, a Republican from Vermont. Prouty maintained that because
human dignity was at stake in discrimination, to label this as a matter
of commerce insulted such dignity. 262 He offered alternative bills:
one resting solely on the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
and another adding them to the commerce power. In support, Prouty attached to the Senate Report over 200 pages of law review articles
and Supreme Court opinions (primarily about the Fourteenth

259. Id.
260. Id. at 11.
261. The Senate Report quotes President Kennedy on “how deeply our Negro citizens
resent the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and accommodations which are otherwise open to the general public. . . . Surely, in 1963, 100 years
after emancipation, it should not be necessary for any American citizen to demonstrate in
the streets for the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a lunch counter in the very
department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion picture house, on the
same terms as any other customer.” Id. at 8–9.
262. S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 2 (1964) (Individual Views of Sen. Winston L. Prouty).
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Amendment). 263 Although the Thirteenth Amendment is the focus of
this Article, it bears mention that Prouty’s Fourteenth Amendment
argument appealed to the Citizenship Clause—the first clause of Section 1, which does not have a state action requirement. 264 He pursued
both his Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments when
questioning constitutional law scholar Erwin Griswold in the Senate
hearings. Griswold expressed initial skepticism about whether Congress could “describe and define incidents of national citizenship to
include national protection of civil rights,” but then commented that
Prouty’s idea had potential and that perhaps it could be stated that
“Congress was, in doing this, defining and prescribing the rights of
citizens of the United States under the 14th amendment.” 265
Turning to the Thirteenth Amendment, Prouty included his exchange with Griswold, in which Prouty invoked Justice Harlan’s view
in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases “that there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude and that
Congress had the power to enact legislation of a direct and primary
character” to eradicate not only the institution of slavery, but also
those “badges and incidents.” He then asked Griswold, “Would you
say that segregation as a system is ‘slavery’ within the contemplation of
the framers of the 13th amendment?” to which Griswold said, “Yes, I
think so.” 266 Prouty quoted Griswold’s further response:
This is quite consistent with, and is in support of, the position I have suggested here; that in addition to the commerce
clause and the 14th amendment, Congress should definitely
utilize its powers under the 13th amendment in passing the
pending bill.

263. Part 2 of Senate Report No. 88-872 consists entirely of Prouty’s individual views,
alternative bills, and materials attached to the Report.
264. For a contemporary argument about Congress’s power under the Citizenship
Clause, see Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010).
265. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 262, at 6. Prouty also reproduces Griswold’s answer
to Senator Pastore where, in discussing the Civil Rights Cases, Griswold observes that it involved Section 2, not Section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Edwards v. California could
furnish strong authority for saying that Congress, under section 1 and section 5
of the 14th amendment, has power to prescribe that the right to move freely
from State to State—and that includes being accommodated when you move,
because you can’t move and just sleep in the ditch by the side of the road—is a
right which Congress can prescribe under the 14th amendment.
Id.
266. Id. at 7.
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Justice Harlan used “badges” of slavery. I said “vestiges” of
slavery. I think we mean exactly the same thing. 267
Like Kennedy, Prouty viewed contemporary discrimination as a
legacy—a vestige—of slavery. He contended that, based on his “reading of the legislative history of the 13th and 14th amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, . . . the intention of the framers to elevate the freed
slaves to full civil freedom has been sidetracked by history. Various
judicial, legislative, and executive obstructions have fallen across the
path to full citizenship.” 268 His bill, resting in the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, instead of the commerce power, “sought to
abolish the historical consequences of slavery and enable the son of
the slave to attain the full stature of citizenship,” specifically, the federal citizenship that “was made dominant over State citizenship,” with
the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 269
Prouty found in the testimony of Robert Kennedy (including the passages I cite above) support for his own argument that discrimination
is an “affront to citizenship” and that the basis for a public accommodations law that protects dignity should be citizenship, not commerce. 270
In support of his Thirteenth Amendment argument, Prouty puts
into the Senate Report “the very valuable law review article” by equality theorist Jacobus tenBroek, 271 which supports the interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment as broadly conceived to obliterate the incidents of slavery and protect “the emancipated negro and his white
friends . . . in the privileges and civil liberties of free men.” 272 Professor tenBroek identifies a critical question: “What was the ‘slavery’
which the Thirteenth Amendment would abolish?” 273 Based on his
study of the legislative debates, he observes that “[t]he opposite of slavery is liberty,” but the liberty was “itemized and detailed,” in terms of
securing the former slave’s “natural and God-given rights,” and affording the “equal protection under the law.” 274 He concludes that
267. Id.
268. Id. at 8.
269. Id. at 9.
270. Id. at 10–11.
271. Id. at 7 (referring to the article as Appendix F). The article, Jacobus tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States—Consummation to Abolition and Key
to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951), appears at S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 262, at 223–55. The original page numbers of the article appear to have been
removed for inclusion as an Appendix to the Report.
272. Jacobus tenBroek, supra note 271, at 176.
273. Id. at 179.
274. Id. at 179–80 (internal quotation marks omitted).

McClainFinalBookProof-NEW

132

12/7/2011 10:17 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:83

both proponents of the Thirteenth Amendment and those who
feared its consequences agreed on a broad conception of the “slavery”
that would be abolished: “the involuntary personal servitude of the
bondman; the denial to the blacks, bond and free, of their natural
rights through the failure of the government to protect them and to
protect them equally; [and] the denial to the whites of their natural
and constitutional rights through a similar failure of government.” 275
Proponents and opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment both understood that it intended a “revolution in federalism.” 276 Professor
tenBroek explains this revolution:
[T]he Thirteenth Amendment either gave or confirmed
congressional power to enforce a constitutional prohibition
against slavery everywhere in the United States; and the liberty which Congress now had constitutional mandate to enforce was not just the liberty of the blacks but the liberty of
the whites as well and included not just freedom from personal bondage but protection in a wide range of natural and
277
constitutional rights.
However, when Congress subsequently debated the civil rights bills
and the Freedmen’s Bureau bill—legislation intended to implement
the Thirteenth Amendment and obliterate the “infamous Black
Codes” that replaced the slave codes—opponents of the Thirteenth
Amendment “now switched to a restrictive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment,” such that “[t]he evil of Negro elevation and
equality which they had loudly proclaimed it would bring about they
now insisted had not been intended to be achieved by it.” 278 This
“narrow constructionist argument” about “the meaning of ‘slavery’
and its abolition”—for example, that it “merely dissolved the relation
of master and slave”—featured as a ground for opposing measures to
“wipe out the remnants, badges and indicia of slavery.” 279
Opposing this narrow constructionist view, “Senator Trumbull, a
principal draftsman both of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Bill,” referred to the Declaration of Independence and the privileges and immunities of citizens in the Constitution and exclaimed:

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 180.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 188, 189.
Id. at 189, 186.
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“It is the intention of this [Civil Rights] bill to secure those rights.” 280
Any statute that does not treat citizens equally and “deprived any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens” is a “badge of
servitude.” 281 Professor tenBroek argues that the repeated references
in the debates to the “full” and “equal” enjoyment of rights point to a
“broad” and “far flung” idea of equal protection. 282 That protection is
“[a]t the very foundation of the system constructed out of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights
Bill.” 283 He concludes that the sponsors of the Thirteenth Amendment viewed it “as doing the whole job—not just cutting loose the fetters which bound the physical person of the slave; but restoring to
him his natural, inalienable and civil rights; or what was the same
thing in other words, guaranteeing to him the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.” 284 Slavery’s opposite is liberty,
“[b]ut liberty in society, civil liberty, consists of natural liberty as restrained by human laws protecting all men in their antecedent rights
and being both general and equal.” 285 He further concludes that
“[t]he Thirteenth Amendment nationalized the right of freedom,”
and the “equal right of all to enjoy protection in those natural rights
which constitute that freedom.” 286 The Fourteenth Amendment,
passed after doubts arose about the adequacy of the Thirteenth
Amendment, “reenacted” the Thirteenth and “made the program of
legislation designed to implement it constitutionally secure or a part
of the Constitution.” 287
Professor tenBroek’s article, thus, appears in the Senate Report
as support for Prouty’s appeal to the Thirteenth Amendment as a
foundation for the 1964 Act. His historical analysis tends to buttress
Prouty’s argument that, under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress
has the power to enact legislation to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery, but “that the intention of the framers to elevate the
freed slaves to full civil freedom has been sidetracked by history.” 288
280. Id. at 190–91. Professor tenBroek explains that “[m]any other speeches are to the
same effect.” Id. at 192 n.46 (giving numerous examples using language of “securing” or
“protecting” rights).
281. Id. at 191.
282. Id. at 199–200.
283. Id. at 200.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 203.
287. Id.
288. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 262, at 8 (Individual Views of Sen. Winston L. Prouty).
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In this context, the Civil Rights Cases are a primary example of the sort
of “obstruction” of this “path to full citizenship.” 289
To return again to Trumbull’s invocation of the Declaration of
Independence, it is striking that the phrase “to secure those rights” is
echoed some eighty years later, in the title to President Harry S. Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights report. 290 The report takes note of
“the fate of the civil rights program developed by Congress following
the close of the Civil War,” with an earlier Supreme Court striking
down (in the Civil Rights Cases) the 1875 public accommodations
act. 291 The report observes that Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases is “a particularly powerful statement,” noting that “[a]s interpreted by the Supreme Court the Constitution does not guarantee
equal access to places of public accommodation and amusement.” 292
In light of this constitutional interpretation, the report expresses the
“hope that enforcement will make practice more compatible with
theory” in the “[eighteen] states that have already enacted [antidiscrimination statutes]” while recommending that “all of the states
should enact such legislation, using the broadest possible definition
of public accommodation.” 293 Written before Brown v. Board of Education, 294 the report recommended “[t]he elimination of segregation,
based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life.” 295
The Thirteenth Amendment is one of “several specific constitutional
bases” it identifies “for federal action in the civil rights field.” As Rebecca Zietlow has observed, “[t]he 1964 Civil Rights Act incorporated
a number of the recommendations” contained in this report. 296 It was
this report, along with the 1875 Act, the Senate Report referred to
when it observed that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was the third time it
had recommended a public accommodations law.

289. Id. at 8, 10.
290. Steven F. Lawson, Preface to TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF PRESIDENT
HARRY S. TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, at iv (Steven F. Lawson ed., 2004)
(1947) [hereinafter Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS].
291. Id. at 131.
292. Id. at 109, 131. The report observes that “[e]ighteen states have statutes prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation”—although the states’ actual “practice does not necessarily conform to the law”—but “[twenty] states by law compel segregation in one way or another.” Id. at 109–10.
293. Id. at 183.
294. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
295. See Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 290, at 179 (determining that
“[t]here is no adequate defense of segregation”).
296. Rebecca Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 945 n.1 (2005).
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D. The House Report and Individual Views
There is far less discussion concerning the Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude in the House Report (and its accompanying individual views) on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Nonetheless, the “general statement” in the Report presents a strong theme
that the new civil rights bill will rectify longstanding injustices and secure the substantive rights of citizenship, thus addressing unfinished
business concerning the end of slavery:
Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation,
Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population,
are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not
accorded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are
considered to be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens. 297
The House Report finds that the “national need” for “national
legislation” is evident from the slow progress made in eliminating discrimination, the “growing impatience by the victims of discrimination,” and “a growing recognition on the part of all our people of the
incompatibility of such discrimination with our ideals and the principles to which this country is dedicated.” 298 Indeed, like the Reconstruction Congress and the 1947 report, the House Report speaks of
the need “to secure these rights”: “A number of provisions of the
Constitution of the United States clearly supply the means to secure
these rights, and H.R. 7152, as amended, resting upon this authority,
is designed as a step toward eradicating significant areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis.” 299
Several representatives, nonetheless, felt there was “a need for
fuller documentation of the reasons for the bill,” and, in their additional views, explicitly linked the current bill to the unfinished business of Reconstruction. They led with the Fourteenth Amendment,
Sections 1 and 5: “Almost a century has elapsed since its ratification,
yet not since Reconstruction has Congress enacted legislation fully
implementing the article. A key purpose of the bill, then, is to secure
to all Americans the equal protection of the laws of the United States
and of the several States.” 300 They also implicitly appealed to the
Thirteenth Amendment by asserting that, over one hundred years
297. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18 (1963).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 1 (1963) (Additional Views of Hon. William M.
McCulloch et al.).
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since emancipation, “the Negro continues to bear the burdens of a
race under the traces of servitude,” evident by “the barrier[s] of racial
inequality” in “employment, education, public service, amusement,
housing, and citizenship.” 301 Defending Title II, the Congressmen
characterized access to public accommodations “regardless of the
color of his skin” as “[a]nother signpost of freedom [that] must be extended to the Negro if he is to overcome racial inequality and if our
country is to live up to its national ideas.” 302 They asserted: “This right
is so distinctive in its nature that its denial constitutes a shocking refutation of a free society.” 303 They contended that nondiscrimination in
such places is a demand of “the badge of citizenship—extended to
Negro as well as white by the 14th amendment,” and they would
ground Title II not only in the commerce power—here confirming
Congress’s power to legislate on moral and social grounds—but also
in the Fourteenth Amendment. 304 They dismissed the “freedom of
association” and “rights of privacy” objections to Title II as “ludicrous”
in light of the distinction between establishments holding themselves
open to the public and private organizations and the existence of
public accommodations laws in thirty-two states. 305
E. The Equation of “Rendering Involuntary Service” with “Involuntary
Servitude”: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Oppose the Civil
Rights Bill
In Part II, I reviewed how Moreton Rolleston, owner of the Heart
of Atlanta Motel, unsuccessfully asserted that Title II, as applied to his
motel, constituted involuntary servitude. In Congress, some lawmakers made similar claims. I will discuss the example of Senator Strom
Thurmond, whose “individual views” are attached to the Senate Report on the public accommodations law. 306 For Thurmond, the “only
valid application” of the Thirteenth Amendment to the law was as

301. Id. at 2.
302. Id. at 7.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 7–8.
305. Id. at 9.
306. The Minority Report to the House Report does not explicitly raise the involuntary
servitude objection to Title II. It objects to the reported bill as “the greatest grasp for executive
power conceived in the 20th century.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, supra note 300, at 64 (Committee
on Judiciary Minority Report). Among the many civil rights it asserts that the new bill will
“seriously impair” is “[t]he right of owners of inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, cafeterias,
lunchrooms, soda fountains, motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas,
stadiums and other places of entertainment to freely carry on their businesses in the service of their customers (title II, title VI, and title VII).” Id. at 64–65.
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“proof of the unconstitutionality of this measure,” not as a support for
it. 307 Even while taking what tenBroek would call a “narrow constructionist” reading of the Thirteenth Amendment with respect to how to
interpret the “badges” of slavery, Thurmond invokes the term “involuntary servitude” broadly to describe the burden of Title II on property owners and their employees.
On the narrow construction point, Thurmond challenges the
hearing’s reference to the Thirteenth Amendment as a source of authority—additional to the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment—for Title II, stating that “the misplaced reliance on this
amendment should not go unanswered.” 308 Thurmond draws parallels between historical and contemporary arguments that denial of
access to public accommodation was “[o]ne of the badges . . . of the
institution of slavery,” asserting: “there is no more validity to it now
than the Court conceded to it in the opinion handed down in
1883.” 309 Thurmond quotes the passage from the Court’s opinion in
which Justice Bradley refers to such an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as “running the slavery argument into the
ground.” 310 Thurmond stresses that the members of the Court lived
“through the purported abolition of the institution of slavery” and the
adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
and thus “a clear understanding of the purposes of the amendments
can be attributed to them.” 311 Thurmond also offers additional arguments about why denial of access to public accommodations is not
a badge or vestige of slavery, including the existence of such discrimination in states outside of the South that have “never known slavery”
and testimony before Congress “that discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, or national origin is not unique to the United
States, but may be found in many other countries.” 312
Turning to how the Thirteenth Amendment, in his view, does apply to Title II—as “an insurmountable constitutional barrier,” he
turns from the Amendment’s abolition of slavery to its prohibition of
involuntary servitude. Thurmond’s rationale is that the new law “does
authorize, even necessitate, involuntary servitude,” because “there is
no constitutional right for any individual to demand service in the

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 43 (Individual Views of Sen. Strom Thurmond).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50 (discussing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
Id. at 51 (same).
Id.
Id. at 52.
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purely private establishments which would be covered by this bill.” 313
By contrast, “[t]here does now exist a right of ownership of private
property,” which, case law indicates, allows a private property owner
to be “‘irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations’ and still be free from arbitrary governmental interference.” 314
Title II would “give[] legal sanction to a totally new and dangerous
principle” by “constrict[ing] the personal and property rights of all
American individuals in an attempt to create a privilege for the favored few.” 315 Patrons of “private establishments would retain their
right to pick and choose among the many,” but an establishment
owner would lose his “right to pick and choose [his] customers.”
“Who can deny that this amounts to involuntary servitude?” 316
Thurmond finds support for his interpretation of “involuntary
servitude” as covering “so-called antidiscrimination laws which compel
one person to serve another” in a dissenting opinion in a 1959 Washington State case upholding the state’s public accommodations law.
He quotes Judge Mallery, in dissent, on why the Thirteenth Amendment should bar such laws, asserting analogies between forms of
“compelled” service:
Negroes should be familiar with this amendment. Since its
passage, they have not been compelled to serve any man
against their will. When a white woman is compelled against
her will to give a Negress a Swedish massage, that too is involuntary servitude . . . .
Through what an arc the pendulum of Negro rights has
swung since the extreme position of the Dred Scott decision.
Those rights reached dead center when the 13th amendment to the U.S. Constitution abolished the ancient wrong
of Negro slavery. This court has now swung to the opposite
extreme in its opinion subjecting white people to “involuntary servitude” to Negroes. 317
This state court judge, quoted by Thurmond, no doubt chose a
deliberately racially provocative example of a white woman having to
touch a black woman, perhaps in a state of undress, in order to stir

313. Id.
314. Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1964)).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 53 (alteration in original) (quoting Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 341 P.2d
859, 869 (Wash. 1959) (en banc) (Mallery, J., dissenting)).
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fears of unwanted and uncomfortable racial mixing—a different paradigm case than someone trying to get food at a lunch counter. 318
The simple equation made by Thurmond and by this judge between “servitude” and serving customers relies on the characterization
of such businesses as entirely “private” and, in so doing, ignores (as I
discussed above) the background rules of the English common law
concerning the duty of innkeepers and other businesses who put out
a sign and are open to the public. Moreover, the reference to the
pendulum swing also is evocative of Justice Bradley, who suggested in
the Civil Rights Cases, that there must come a point when the Negro
ceases being a “special favorite of the laws” and must stand on his own
feet. 319 Similarly, Thurmond concludes that the public accommodations law “directs an invasion of private property by a favored class of
individuals and assures them the assistance of the Federal Government in their efforts. It amounts to a first and significant step toward
the complete control of private lives and property, obliterating the
remaining freedom of the individual.” 320
Thurmond buttresses his Thirteenth Amendment argument
against the public accommodations law by citing to “a very scholarly
and well-prepared brief . . . submitted for the record by Mr. Alfred
Avins, on behalf of the Liberty Lobby.” 321 Avins—evidently a “prolific
writer on public accommodations law” 322—advanced in his writing the
view that public accommodation laws gave African-Americans “special
privileges,” and that “civil rights laws, which started as a way of giving
318. The Washington case involved a refusal to wait on an African-American woman at a
salon that advertised that it would provide a sample “slenderizing treatment.” No details
are provided about the nature of the treatment. See Browning, 341 P.2d at 861 (majority
opinion). For many readers, this mention of the fear of unwanted racial mixing may bring
to mind that, in 2003, several months after Senator Thurmond’s death, his family acknowledged that 78-year-old retired school teacher Essie Mae Washington-Williams was
Thurmond’s biracial, nonmarital daughter. She was born, in 1925, to a black teenage
housekeeper in the Thurmond household with whom Thurmond had sexual relations
when he was 22 years old. David Mattingly, Strom Thurmond’s Family Confirms Paternity
Claim,
CNN.com
(Dec.
16,
2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/12/15/thurmond.paternity/index.html?iref=allsearch.
Essie Mae Washington-Williams learned that Thurmond was her father and met him when
she was 16; thereafter, he provided some financial support and they had intermittent contact over the years. Rebecca Leung, Essie Mae on Strom Thurmond, CBS NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/17/60II/main589107.shtml.
319. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
320. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 75–76.
321. Id. at 53; A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate
Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1202 (1963) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2] (statement of Alfred Avins on behalf of the Liberty
Lobby).
322. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1299 n.37.
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Negroes the same rights as everybody else, have culminated in a system giving them more rights than anybody else.” 323 In the “brief” to
which Thurmond refers, Avins canvasses case law about involuntary
servitude and extracts from it a principle he repeatedly asserts: “To
coerce personal service is to impose involuntary servitude.” 324 The jurisprudence on the common law obligation of innkeepers and other
establishments open to the public stresses the “duty to serve,” but
Avins instead equates “rendering involuntary service” with “involuntary servitude.” 325 Avins focuses not only on the rights of the owner of
the commercial establishment, but also on the employee who must
render the service or refuse, on pain of the punishment of leaving his
job (violating his constitutional “right to work”). 326 Avins warns:
“however compelling the need may seem that individuals serve others
in particular situations, such a requirement flies in the face of the
strong and clear policy of the 13th Amendment.” 327 Avins quotes language from the Supreme Court, declaring that “‘[t]he undoubted aim
of the 13th amendment . . . was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the
United States’” and warns that “[t]he clear words of this amendment
cannot be frittered away by subtle subterfuge or refined legaleze.” 328
Avins argues that the arbitrariness of the refusal to serve makes no difference—a contention also made by Thurmond about the rights of
private property owners. 329 Avins concludes with a supposedly “compelling” historical irony “that in 1963, Negroes are demanding laws to
compel whites to serve them in the very same occupations which they
themselves were freed from serving whites in 1863, and demanding
323. Alfred Avins, What Is a Place of “Public” Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 59, 69
(1968) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). Singer explains that Avins’s argument was that the 1875 public accommodations law did so by cutting back on states’
ability to repeal the common law right of access, which some states had done to avoid giving African-Americans a right of access. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1299
n.37.
324. Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 1209 (statement of Alfred Avins).
325. On these common law duties, see id. at 1202 (“A statute which requires one person
to render involuntary service to another immediately raises the question of its constitutionality under the 13th amendment.”); Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1439–43
(discussing the common law implications of public right of access laws).
326. See Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 1212–15 (statement of Alfred Avins)
(explaining how forcing individuals to serve minorities or lose their job “constitutes such a
degree of coercion as to make the service involuntary”).
327. Id. at 1215.
328. Id. at 1215–16 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1914)).
329. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 63 (“The fundamental attribute of property is
the right to exclude others.”) (citations omitted).
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this under the name of ‘freedom.’” 330 Avins appeals to the broad intended scope of the Thirteenth Amendment—to “‘reach[] every race
and every individual’” and be “a charter of universal freedom for all
persons.” 331
But this freedom, in his view, is wholly compatible with discrimination. Like Thurmond, Avins quotes dissenting Judge Mallery’s
statement about the pendulum swing to “subjecting white people to
‘involuntary servitude’ to Negroes,” adding this further quote:
“[D]iscrimination is but another word for free choice. Indeed, he
would not be free himself if he had no right so to do. In dealings between men, both cannot be free unless each acts voluntarily, otherwise one is subjected to the other’s will.” 332
F. The 2004 Commemoration of the Civil Rights Act and Dissenting
Views in 2004 and 2010
In 2004, the House of Representatives adopted—with one “nay”
vote—a resolution honoring the fortieth anniversary of congressional
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “encourag[ing] all Americans to recognize and celebrate the important historical milestone” of
such passage. 333 The language of the resolution and the rhetoric of
the lawmakers speaking in support of it have little to do with goods
moving in commerce and much to do with the same kind of arguments that supported Title II itself: appeals to political morality and
to a long struggle to secure equality. 334 That resolution recognizes the
civil rights movement as a catalyst to the passage of the Act: “[T]he
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the result of decades of struggle and sacrifice of many Americans who fought for equality and justice.” 335 It also
implicitly recognizes the Act as a long-overdue remedy to a national
problem of discrimination: “Whereas generations of Americans of
every background supported Federal legislation to eliminate discrim-

330. See Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 1216 (continuing that “a century
ago, Negroes had a near monopoly on the service occupations now engaged in by employees of so-called ‘places of public accommodation’”).
331. Id. at 1217–18 (quoting Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906)).
332. Id. at 1218–19 (quoting Browning v. Slenderalla Sys., 341 P.2d 859, 868 (Wash.
1959) (en banc) (Mallery, J., dissenting)).
333. Honoring 40th Anniversary of Passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 150 CONG. REC.
13,661, 13,661–62 (2004) [hereinafter 40th Anniversary].
334. Cf. Zietlow, supra note 296, at 948 (arguing that the “forthright discussion of fundamental constitutional and moral values” in the congressional debate over the 1964 Act
makes the debate “particularly rich in constitutional meaning”).
335. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,661.
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ination against African Americans.” 336 The resolution “applaud[s] all
those whose support and efforts lead [sic] to passage” of the Act, the
“most comprehensive civil rights legislation in our Nation’s history.” 337
The individual statements by members of Congress in support of
House Resolution 676 also recognize the role of struggle in bringing
about the Act (including those by members of Congress who were, at
the time, civil rights leaders and activists, such as Rep. John Lewis of
Georgia 338 and Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia339). Representative Lewis himself reminded his colleagues
that “the Civil Rights Act of 1964 just did not happen,” but “took
many years, many months of struggle on the part of a disciplined and
organized movement that created . . . an environment for action” by
the President and Congress. 340 Lewis situated the Act in the environment of “the American south” of the 1950s and 1960s, where
“[s]egregation and discrimination were the order of the day,” and
where, as a child and then a “participant in the civil rights movement,” he saw the “white” and “colored” signs marking stores, train
stations, restaurants, and hotels. 341 He recalls that the nonviolent efforts of “ordinary people,” met by beatings, jailings, and killings, and
then the death of the four young girls in a church bombing, created a
“righteous indignation,” where “[a]ll across America, by the hundreds
and thousands, people started demanding that the Federal Government act.” 342 Because of this action and the response by two presidents and Congress, America has witnessed “a nonviolent revolution
in America, a revolution of values, a revolution of ideas.” 343 America
today, he concluded, is a “better Nation, we are a better people, better
in the process of laying down the burdens of race.” 344 This language
of burden, of course, brings to mind shedding the badges and incidents of slavery, of which segregation was one component. In 2011,
Lewis, who was a leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee in the 1960s and the youngest speaker at the 1963 March

336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 13,664 (remarks by Rep. Jackson-Lee) (describing Rep. Lewis as “our own
special icon and warrior for peace”).
339. Id. (“Might I first give my accolades and appreciation to the gentlewoman from the
District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON) for her fight on the battlefield for civil rights . . . .”).
340. Id. at 13,663 (remarks by Rep. Lewis).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
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on Washington, received the Medal of Freedom for his work in the
civil rights movement and his work in Congress. 345
Lewis refers to a revolution of values and ideas. An AfricanAmerican representative from a later generation, Artur Davis of Alabama, referred to himself and similar representatives as the “legatees”
as well as “the hope of what was done here 40 years ago,” that changing the law could “build an America that had never been.” 346 Davis
and other speakers also referred to the morality of the Act. Davis refers to using “the power of law to shape the American dream” and
that, contrary to the “fashionable” claim that “you cannot legislate
morality in this country,” the Act shows that “law can be used to shape
our moral character; law can be used to set the boundaries of what we
will tolerate and what we will not accept.” 347 Another speaker praised
the leaders who championed the Act as “visionaries armed with a truly
moral cause,” quoting Senator Everett Dirksen on the point that the
Act was “essentially moral in character.” 348
In an echo of Lewis’s statement about finally laying down the
burdens of race, another Congressman reminded lawmakers that the
Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, had struck down the “prototypical form” of the Act, but “[i]n 1964, the Congress acted and we
made it stick.” 349 “[F]inally,” with this Act, America could send a message to the world about protecting individual “freedom not only from
outside aggressors, but from those in your own country who would
deny employment benefits to you or deny you access to a public place
because of your race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 350 This is
a striking parallel to the 1947 Presidential report, which noted that
the greatest threats to civil rights could come from private individuals
and groups. 351 The 1964 Act, thus, helped America live up to its
founding ideals:
[W]ith this enactment, the United States finally established
in permanent, positive law the fulfillment of the vision of the
grand words of our founders; that our Nation would not

345. Kori Schulman, President Obama Honors Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients, THE
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2011/02/15/watch-live-president-obama-honors-presidential-medal-freedom-recipients
(describing John Lewis as “a giant of the Civil Rights movement”).
346. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,665 (remarks of Rep. Davis).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 13,666 (remarks of Rep. Visclosky).
349. Id. at 13,664 (statement of Rep. Cox).
350. Id.
351. Lawson, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 290, at 109.

McClainFinalBookProof-NEW

144

12/7/2011 10:17 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:83

treat its citizens differently any more than they are treated
differently in the eyes of God, their creator. 352
One speaker explicitly sounded the theme that the segregation
the Act attacked was part of “the legacy of slavery,” which the Act
“brought us closer to dismantling;” he also noted “de facto discrimination [that] continues to pervade many of our institutions,” and observed that there are still forms of second class citizenship that require national attention. 353 Because the Act also included a historic
prohibition on sex discrimination in employment, speakers drew
analogies between race and sex in terms of their narratives of progress
made—and progress still to be made—by 1964 354 and even by 2004. 355
Now I turn to the lone objector to the resolution: Representative
Ron Paul, father of current Senator Rand Paul and a candidate for
the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, explained that he
joined his “colleagues in urging Americans to celebrate the progress
this country has made in race relations.” 356 However, he continued,
contrary to the claims of the supporters of the Civil Rights Act and
supporters of the commemorative resolution, “the Civil Rights Act of
1964 did not improve race relations or enhance freedom.” 357 While
Paul did not explicitly refer to involuntary servitude, the language of
coercion and force—as well as impingement on private property
rights—is prominent in his objection:
Instead, the forced integration dictated by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 increased racial tensions while diminishing individual liberty.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the federal government
unprecedented power over the hiring, employee relations,
and customer service practices of every business in the country. The result was a massive violation of the rights of private
property and contract, which are the bedrocks of free socie-

352. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,663 (statement of Rep. Cox).
353. Id. at 13,666 (statement of Rep. Cummings).
354. Id. at 13,663–64 (statement of Rep. Cox).
355. Id. at 13,664–65 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (calling attention to “the progress
we have yet to make in order to fulfill the tenets of [the] Civil Rights Act of 1964,” such as
voting rights problems in her home state of Texas).
356. Id. at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul).
357. Id. Thanks to Garrett Epps for pointing this historical parallel out to me. See Garrett Epps, Rand Paul’s American Mistake: Taking ‘New’ for ‘Unconstitutional,’ THE ATLANTIC
(May 25, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/print/2010/05/rand-paulsamerican-mistake-taking-new-for-unconstiutional/57246/ (observing that Rand Paul was
“channelling ancestral voices” when he “blundered into arguing that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was somehow constitutionally suspect”).
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ty. The federal government has no legitimate authority to
infringe on the rights of private property owners to use their
property as they please and to form (or not form) contracts
with terms mutually agreeable to all parties. The rights of all
private property owners, even those whose actions decent
people find abhorrent, must be respected if we are to maintain a free society. 358
In this passage, Paul’s conception of both what it means to have a
“free society” and of private property rights is similar to that asserted
by Senator Strom Thurmond in opposition to the 1964 Act. 359 Thurmond (as discussed above) explicitly condemned Title II as involuntary servitude and countered with a conception of private property on
which “an individual may be ‘irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations’ and still be free from arbitrary governmental interference.” 360 Thurmond asserted that voluntary desegregation was the only kind that would be successful, just as Paul asserted
that progress in race relations was “due to changes in public attitudes
and private efforts,” not because of the Act. Paul also challenged
Congress’s “erroneous interpretation” of its power to regulate interstate commerce. 361
Writing several years before this congressional resolution, Reva
Siegel and Robert Post argued that the “protracted struggle” culminating in the passage of the 1964 Act “fundamentally altered the ways
in which Americans reasoned about national power, changing understandings of both federalism and liberty.” 362 Pertinent here is their
contention that “[b]efore 1964, it was still commonplace for public
figures like Robert Bork and Milton Friedman to decry the prospect
of federal interference with the freedom of business owners to discriminate in their choice of customers or employees, and to equate it
with McCarthyism, communism, fascism, socialism, involuntary servitude, or worse.” Those types of “public and prominent objections to
federal enforcement of antidiscrimination norms now sound like
voices from another world.” 363

358. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul).
359. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 46.
360. Id. at 52 (quoting Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963)).
361. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,667.
362. Post, supra note 113, at 492.
363. Id. at 492–93 (footnote omitted). Epps discusses this observation in the context of
drawing parallels between objections to the 1964 Act and to the recent federal health care
law. Epps, supra note 357.
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In 2004, Representative Paul rooted his objections not in any explicit “ism” so much as “diminishing individual liberty” and (correspondingly) overweening bureaucratic and judicial control. 364 He was,
after all, the sole “nay” vote, which tends to confirm “the fundamental
changes wrought by the second Reconstruction,” of which the 1964
Act was a significant part. 365
In 2010, controversy erupted when Rand Paul, son of Representative Paul and winner of the Kentucky Republican primary for U.S.
Senate (with the support of the Tea Party), made public statements
that seemed critical of Title II and supportive of a right of private
businesses to take race into account in deciding whether to serve customers. 366 For Paul, the problem rested in the notion that government could tell a privately owned business what to do. In a newspaper
interview, Paul was asked whether it would be okay not to serve Dr.
Martin Luther King at the Woolworth’s counter. 367 His answer is strikingly similar to Thurmond’s and his father’s answer in terms of his
conception of what a “free society” must tolerate: “I would not go to
that Woolworth’s, and I would stand up in my community and say it’s
abhorrent,” he responded. “In a free society, we will tolerate boorish
people who have abhorrent behavior. But if we’re civilized people, we
publicly criticize that and don’t belong to those groups or associate
with those people.” 368
In subsequent interviews, Paul elaborated on his views, stressing
the public or private distinction and his preference for local rather
than federal solutions. 369 On MSNBC, Paul answered Rachel Maddow’s question about desegregating lunch counters with an odd analogy to prohibiting guns in restaurants:
Well, what it gets into then is if you decide that restaurants
are publicly owned and not privately owned, then do you say
that you should have the right to bring your gun into a restaurant even though the owner of the restaurant says, “Well,
no, we don’t want to have guns in here”; the bar says, “We
364. 40th Anniversary, supra note 333, at 13,667 (statement of Rep. Paul).
365. Post, supra note 113, at 493.
366. Joseph Gerth, Rand Paul Embroiled in Civil Rights Controversy over Remarks Made on
Courier-Journal Video Interview, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (May 20, 2010), http://www.courierjournal.com/article/20100520/NEWS0101/5200351/Rand-Paul-embroiled-Civil-Rightscontroversy-over-remarks-made-Courier-Journal-video-interview.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Ken Rudin, Rand Paul in Civil Rights Bill Firestorm, NPR.ORG (May 20, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/politicaljunkie/2010/05/20/127009788/kentucky-gop-unityrally-on-saturday-mongiardo-d-won-t-seek-recanvass.
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don’t want to have guns in here because people might drink
and start fighting and shoot each other.” Does the owner of
the restaurant own his restaurant? Or does the government
own his restaurant? These are important philosophical debates but not a very practical discussion. 370
In the face of a firestorm over his various remarks about the Civil
Rights Act, Paul issued a statement that (1) clarified his support for
the Civil Rights Act and disavowed any intent to repeal it; (2) acknowledged that the constitutional issues surrounding the Act were
debated at the time and settled by judges; (3) acknowledged the long
and unfinished struggle for civil rights; while also (4) condemning
“overreaching” by the federal government, most recently in health
care:
I believe we should work to end all racism in American society and staunchly defend the inherent rights of every person. . . .
Let me be clear: I support the Civil Rights Act because I
overwhelmingly agree with the intent of the legislation,
which was to stop discrimination in the public sphere and
halt the abhorrent practice of segregation and Jim Crow
laws.
. . . [S]ections of the Civil Rights Act were debated on Constitutional grounds when the legislation was passed. Those
issues have been settled by federal courts in the intervening
years.
....
The issue of civil rights is one with a tortured history in this
country. We have made great strides, but there is still work
to be done to ensure the great promise of Liberty is granted
371
to all Americans.
And finally, Paul struck a different concluding note about the risks of
overreaching federal governmental power and warned that liberty is
threatened by regulation:
This much is clear: The federal government has far overreached in its power grabs. Just look at the recent national
healthcare schemes, which my opponent supports. The federal government, for the first time ever, is mandating that
individuals purchase a product. The federal government is

370. Id.
371. Id.
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out of control, and those who love liberty and value individ372
ual and state’s rights must stand up to it.
G. A Question of Baseline: Property Rights and Duties and
Understandings of Freedom
For Rand Paul, private property ownership translates into an entitlement to be free from federal regulation, which threatens liberty
and individual and state’s rights. That is his baseline. His public
statement, thus, condemns Jim Crow laws and supports stopping discrimination “in the public sphere.” Although this public statement is
silent on the question of private discrimination, his earlier, more controversial remarks—and writings—insist on the significance of the
public/private distinction, and that “[a] free society will abide unofficial, private discrimination,” including exclusion on the basis of skin
color. 373 Of course, Title II treated only certain private establishments
as public accommodations, just as contemporary state public accommodations laws—although often more expansive than Title II—do
not treat every private entity as a public accommodation. 374
In the debates over Title II, many proponents viewed the relevant
baseline as the common law duty of innkeepers and certain other entities to serve the public. The Senate Report stressed that “the requirement that public accommodations and facilities serving the general public do so without racial or religious discrimination is neither
new nor novel” and asserted that “[t]he doctrines that to a large extent sustain this result are deeply rooted in English common law but
by no means limited to common carriers.” 375 The Report devoted
considerable space to rebutting the claim that private property rights
are absolute and bar a public accommodations law (some of which
Justice Douglas quotes in his concurrence, as discussed in Part II). 376
Implicitly, it rejected any notion that a duty to serve the public without discrimination when one operates a business “in which the public
has an interest” is a form of involuntary servitude. 377 But the Report
372. Id.
373. Gerth, supra note 366 (quoting Paul’s 2002 letter to the editor of the Bowling Green
Daily News: “A free society will abide unofficial, private discrimination . . . even when that
means allowing hate-filled groups to exclude people based on the color of their skin. It is
unenlightened and ill-informed to promote discrimination against individuals based on
the color of their skin. It is likewise unwise to forget the distinction between public (taxpayer-financed) and private entities.” (alteration in original)).
374. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1414–15.
375. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 9.
376. Id. at 22–23.
377. Id. at 9–10.
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also noted how, in the late nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, states adopted laws that abrogated this common law duty and even, in some instances, required segregation. 378 Similarly,
when Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified in support of the
bill, he provided a list of the various state laws mandating segregation. 379 As Kennedy did, the Senate Report also pointed out the incongruity that, while private property rights now were invoked as supposed constitutional barriers to Title II, “the right of the private
property owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never claimed
when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property owner from
dealing with persons of a particular race.” 380 Congress viewed a national law as necessary because, although a majority of states now had
laws protecting against racial discrimination in access to public accommodations, eighteen did not. 381 Indeed, noting that President
Truman’s 1947 report recommended that states enact public accommodations laws (at that time eighteen states had such laws), the Senate Report (as noted above) stated: “This bill, then, is the second attempt to achieve Federal legislation and the third time equal access to
public accommodations has been recommended as a national
goal.” 382
As Joseph Singer exhaustively demonstrates, “[t]he legal treatment of public accommodations is ambiguous, changing, and confused from after the Civil War until the start of the Jim Crow era in
the 1880s”—the era during which Congress passed the 1875 Act and
the Court struck the Act down. 383 This was due in part to some states
retrenching on the common law obligation either by abrogating it
completely 384 or by courts interpreting it to permit racial segregation
in providing services. 385 Noting these developments, Singer calls Justice Bradley’s statement in the Civil Rights Cases about the current
state of state laws concerning innkeepers and public carriers (“Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we
are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith

378. Id. at 10.
379. Hearings on S. 1732, pt. 2, supra note 321, at 20–21 (putting into record “State or
Local Laws Compelling Racial Segregation in Public Accommodations”).
380. S. REP. NO. 88-872, supra note 4, at 22.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 11.
383. Singer, No Right to Exclude, supra note 168, at 1353–54.
384. Id. at 1386–88.
385. Id. at 1367–73.
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apply for them”) “shocking” in its “disingenuousness.” 386 With the advent of Jim Crow laws, states required segregation.
The confused state of public accommodations law in that era was
also due to tension between competing legal understandings of property rights, with one baseline being an absolutist right to exclude and
the other, invoked by Congress a century later, being that when one
hangs out a sign, one invites in the public and cannot exclude for arbitrary reasons. The first baseline would permit posting the “whites”
and “colored” signs so pervasive in segregation; the latter would
not. 387 Singer observes, “American law now contains a fundamental
background principle of equality in the rules governing the marketplace. Congress has made this clear.” 388 Singer links this baseline to
the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery as well as to civil
rights statutes. Contrary to the conception of “liberty” and a “free society” articulated by Title II’s critics and, more recently, by Rand Paul,
Singer contends: “Civil rights statutes are not intrusive interferences
with liberty. They are what make us a free and democratic society.” 389
He elaborates:
Our constitutions, statutes, and common law protect our
democracy from devolving into a racial caste society, feudal
society, or a patriarchy. This protection comes from setting
minimum standards for economic relationships compatible
with the norms of a free and democratic society that treats
every person with equal concern and respect. 390
Contrary to the notion of what a free society must tolerate, however odious, Singer argues that “[s]egregation and exclusion on the
basis of race are outside the bounds of acceptable conduct by owners
and operators of public accommodations in a free and democratic society;” they are inconsistent with “our current settled convictions
about the contours of economic relationships” in such a society. 391
Part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel and the law it upheld is
creating those settled convictions.

386. Id. at 1397–98 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 103 U.S. 3, 25 (1883)).
387. Id. at 1373.
388. Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 199, at 109.
389. Id. at 107 (emphasis removed).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 108. Singer uses as an example the trouble Rand Paul got into because of his
criticism of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 107.

McClainFinalBookProof-NEW

2011]

12/7/2011 10:17 AM

THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL, INC.

151

IV. THE LEGACY OF HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL FOR SUBSEQUENT
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THEIR CRITICS
What is the legacy of the Heart of Atlanta Motel case for later antidiscrimination laws and challenges to them? An instructive example
of how salient themes in the majority and concurring opinions recur
392
in subsequent jurisprudence is Roberts v. United States Jaycees. In this
case, twenty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Court’s
upholding of its constitutionality, the Court upheld the application of
Minnesota’s public accommodations law to the Jaycees against a constitutional challenge that requiring the organization to admit women
violated its rights to freedom of association. 393 Several themes important to the Heart of Atlanta Motel case recur in the Court’s analysis.
First, and perhaps most important, is “dignity” and the analogy the
Court draws between stigmatic harms based on race and sex discrimination. The Court intermingles Minnesota’s concerns about protecting its citizens “from a number of serious social and personal harms”
with the Court’s own recognition, in its anti-stereotyping Equal Protection cases, about harms to dignity and to participation in society. 394
Citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, in which “we emphasized that [Title II’s]
fundamental object . . . was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments,’” the Court interchanges race and sex in its statements
about the stigmatic injury due to denial of equal access to public establishments. 395
A second interesting feature is the Court’s reference to the relationship between federal and state antidiscrimination laws and the
long federal hiatus after the Civil Rights Cases. The Court remarks
upon the initiative of states in passing antidiscrimination laws in the
absence of federal legislative efforts. It observes: “The Minnesota
Human Rights Act at issue here is an example of public accommodations laws that were adopted by some States beginning a decade before enactment of their federal counterpart, the Civil Rights Act of
1875[.]” 396 Between the time the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 and when Congress “reentered the field in 1957,”
Minnesota’s civil rights laws, like those of many other states, was “the

392. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
393. Id. at 626.
394. Id. at 625.
395. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250
(1964)) (alterations in both).
396. Id. at 624.
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primary means for protecting the civil rights of historically disadvantaged groups.” 397 The Court notes that, “[l]ike many other States,
Minnesota has progressively broadened the scope of its public accommodations law,” adding “sex” to the list of protected categories in
1973. 398
A third implicit parallel between the two cases is that the Court
approves Minnesota’s adoption of “a functional definition of public
accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasicommercial conduct,” a definition reflecting the realities of a changing economy. 399 Heart of Atlanta Motel observed that “the conditions of
transportation and commerce have changed dramatically” from 1875,
such that the Court “must apply those principles to the present state
of commerce” where “[t]he sheer increase in volume of interstate
traffic alone would give discriminatory practices which inhibit travel a
far larger impact upon the Nation’s commerce than such practices
had on the economy of another day.” 400 Citing to its own sexdiscrimination precedents in support, the Roberts Court states that
“[t]his expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the American economy and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration that have historically
plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women.” 401 The
Court accepts the Minnesota court’s explanation that the local chapters of the Jaycees are “‘place[s] of public accommodations’” because
of “the various commercial programs and benefits offered to members,” such that “‘[l]eadership skills are ‘goods,’ [and] business contacts and employment promotions are ‘privileges’ and ‘advantages.’” 402 The Supreme Court concludes: “Assuring women equal access
to such goods, privileges, and advantages clearly furthers compelling
state interests.” 403
A fourth parallel concerns the issue of harm to the entity treated
as a public accommodation. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court observed that evidence was to the contrary on the owner’s claim that integration would harm his business, but even if there was some harm,

397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 625–26.
400. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 251.
401. 468 U.S. at 626.
402. Id. at 626 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d
764, 772 (Minn. 1981)).
403. Id.
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that was constitutional. 404 The type of harm alleged in Roberts was
harm from forced inclusion of women as members. 405 The Court in
Roberts—and subsequently in Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte 406 and New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of
New York 407—opined that forcing an all-male group to accept female
members would not significantly burden it or its ability to convey messages. 408 But the Court went on to assert that even if the public accommodations law “causes some incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’
protected speech, that effect is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate purposes.” 409 Here the Court, in another
parallel to Heart of Atlanta Motel, turns to the language of discrimination as an evil that government may prevent: “As we have explained,
acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent—wholly apart from the
point of view such conduct may transmit.” 410 By contrast, the Court
reached a different conclusion in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale with respect to New Jersey’s public accommodations law compelling the Boy
Scouts to admit a homosexual as a scoutmaster: not only would that
law unconstitutionally impair the Scouts’ ability to convey its messages, but—the court summarily asserted—New Jersey’s interests did “not
justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of
expressive association.” 411
I will now look briefly at how Heart of Atlanta Motel features in two
recent Supreme Court opinions cutting back on the Court’s deference to Congress’s exercise of its commerce power, United States v.
Lopez 412 and United States v. Morrison. 413 I will focus more on Morrison
because it considered an antidiscrimination law, the civil rights remedy portion of the Violence Against Women Act. The majority and the
dissents in these controversial decisions differ over the import of Heart
of Atlanta Motel. The majorities in Lopez and Morrison stress the need
to distinguish the truly economic from the noneconomic and the truly national from the purely local and warn of Congress using the
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 260.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
481 U.S. 537, 547 (1987).
487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615, 627–29.
Id. at 628.
Id.
530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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commerce power so as to “obliterate” such distinctions. 414 Heart of Atlanta Motel features in string citations for Congress’s power to “regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.” 415
In Lopez, where the Court invalidated the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act, Heart of Atlanta Motel, along with McClung (the Ollie’s Barbeque case), feature as instances where the Court has “upheld
a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity substantially affected
interstate commerce.” 416 By contrast, the majority finds an insufficient impact on the national economy to warrant a federal law concerning guns in schools. 417 Concurring Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor offer Heart of Atlanta Motel as an “example[] of the exercise
of federal power where commercial transactions were the subject of
regulation” and reassure that this and other authorities are “within
the fair ambit of the Court’s practical conception of commercial regulation and are not called in question by our decision today.” 418
Justice Souter’s dissent in Lopez cites Heart of Atlanta Motel and
McClung to highlight the proper deference the Court should give to
Congress, under rational basis review, once it “find[s] that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce.” 419 In Heart of Atlanta Motel, he explains, “with the
challenge to congressional Commerce Clause authority to prohibit
racial discrimination in places of public accommodation . . . the Court
simply made explicit” the deferential test implicit in its earlier precedents. 420 Justice Souter warns of the “backward glance,” at the end of
the century, toward the Court’s “untenable” jurisprudence from the
Lochner era, pointing to its reliance on problematic distinctions between the commercial and noncommercial. 421
In Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg), Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung appear as cases in
which the Court recognized that a problem of discrimination could
have economic and personal harm. Thus, the Court upheld the law

414. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616–18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 567–68.
415. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 256 (1964)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (same).
416. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
417. Id. at 567.
418. Id. at 573–74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
419. Id. at 607 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 608.
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in McClung “in part because that discrimination discouraged travel by
African Americans and in part because that discrimination affected
purchases of food and restaurant supplies from other States.” 422 In
those cases, Justice Breyer writes, “the Court understood that the specific instance of discrimination (at a local place of accommodation)
was part of a general practice that, considered as a whole, caused not
only the most serious human and social harm, but had nationally significant economic dimensions as well.” 423 He argues that similar human and social harms and national economic consequences stem
from “local instances” of school violence, “taken together and considered as a whole.” 424 Further, he argues that upholding the law as
under the commerce power would, as in Heart of Atlanta Motel, “simply . . . apply pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances.” 425
In Morrison, the majority struck down the civil rights remedy portion (concerning gender-motivated acts of violence) of the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”). 426 Referencing Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist repeats its invocation of Heart of Atlanta Motel for the points
that “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce” and that the Court has upheld a “wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where [it has] concluded that the activity substantially affected commerce.” 427 The
Court goes on to conclude that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.” 428 In
Lopez, the Court said Congress lacked sufficient findings, but here, the
VAWA provision before the Court “is supported by numerous findings
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on
victims and their families.” 429 However, findings alone are not
enough, for as Lopez teaches (citing Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel): “‘[w]hether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional
power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than

422. Id. at 626 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
423. Id.
424. Id. at 626–27.
425. Id. at 624–25.
426. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (“Congress’ effort . . . to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
427. Id. at 609, 610 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
428. Id. at 613.
429. Id. at 614 (emphasis in original).
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a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.’” 430
In an often-criticized passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts: “The
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local,” concluding that “[t]he regulation and punishment
of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been
the province of the States.” 431 Morever, the Civil Rights Cases opinion
makes an appearance as still “good law” on the need for there to be
state action to trigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 432
In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Souter observes that “the legislative record here is far more voluminous than the record compiled by Congress and found sufficient in
two prior cases upholding Title II”: Heart of Atlanta Motel and
McClung. 433 He notes that “Congress had relied on compelling anecdotal reports that individual instances of segregation cost thousands
to millions of dollars,” and also had “evidence” about the differential
spending of the average black and white family, attributed in significant part to discrimination. 434 When Congress built a record concerning VAWA, it relied on estimates in dollar costs (in the billions) of the
harms of domestic violence. 435 But Justice Souter also stresses the
human costs, pointing out how, in building the record for VAWA,
Congress noted analogies between racial discrimination and genderbased violence:
Equally important [to the cost estimates], gender-based violence in the 1990’s was shown to operate in a manner similar to racial discrimination in the 1960’s in reducing the
mobility of employees and their production and consumption of goods shipped in interstate commerce. Like racial
discrimination, “[g]ender-based violence bars its most likely

430. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 & n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))).
431. Id. at 617–18 (citations omitted).
432. See id. at 624–26 (noting that the VAWA “is not aimed at proscribing discrimination
by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is directed not
at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated
by gender bias”).
433. Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
434. Id.
435. Id. (noting that in 1994, Congress relied “on evidence of the harms caused by domestic violence and sexual assault, citing annual costs of $3 billion in 1990 . . . and $5 to
$10 billion in 1993”).
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targets—women—from full partic[ipation] in the national
economy.” 436
Justice Souter asserts that, until Lopez, VAWA “would have passed
muster” in the period “in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding” of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 437 He observes
that “this understanding was secure even against the turmoil at the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 438 Indeed, in the “aftermath”
of that turmoil, the Court “not only reaffirmed” that stable understanding, but also “declined to limit the commerce power through a
formal distinction between legislation focused on ‘commerce’ and
statutes addressing ‘moral and social wrong[s].’” 439
In Justice Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
(in certain parts) Ginsburg, he takes the majority to task for its untenable distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” activities. 440
He enlists Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung at several points, not only to illustrate the difficulty of drawing such a line but also to demonstrate Congress’s authority “‘to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses.’” 441 Justice Breyer also
enlists Heart of Atlanta Motel in his critique of the majority’s distinction
between truly local and truly national activity in light of an increasingly interconnected nation:
We live in a Nation knit together by two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental change.
Those changes, taken together, mean that virtually every
kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect
commerce, or its conditions, outside the State—at least
when considered in the aggregate. 442
436. Id. at 635–36 (citation omitted).
437. Id. at 637.
438. Id.
439. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc v. United States, 397 U.S. 241, 257
(1964)). This “stable understanding” is that “the Commerce Clause, complemented by the
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause, . . . extended to all activity that, when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id.
440. Id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 656–58 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256).
442. Id. at 660 (citing Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251). Finally, although Justice Breyer
would sustain the VAWA provision at issue under the Commerce Clause, and does not
reach the question of Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
(also reminiscent of the Heart of Atlanta Motel Court), he questions the relevance of the
Civil Rights Cases to the instant case. Id. at 664. The 1883 case held that Section 5 “does
not authorize Congress to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of power to remedy
the conduct of private persons,” but the federal government’s argument about the VAWA
civil rights remedy is that it aimed to remedy actions of “state actors”—the documented fail-
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The Court’s sharp departure from deference to Congress’s
judgments about its exercise of the commerce power to address significant moral and social evils with national economic dimensions makes
the prudential strategy adopted by Congress in enacting Title II—and
supported by the Court in upholding Title II—now seem all the more
historic. The fate of the commerce power in such decisions has also
sparked considerable discussion by scholars of more robust understanding and employment of the Fourteenth Amendment, including
the Citizenship Clause (championed so long ago by Senator Prouty). 443 Perhaps such examination might fruitfully include the potential of the Thirteenth Amendment, which, I have argued, played a
significant, if underappreciated, role in the passage of the 1964 feder444
al public accommodations law
V. CONCLUSION
An aim of this Article was to draw attention to the contrasting
ways that arguments about the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition
on slavery and involuntary servitude played a role in the enactment of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, in which the United States Supreme Court upheld that
public accommodations law. The hotel owner, like some members of
Congress who opposed Title II, alleged that the Thirteenth Amendment was a bar to Title II, because compelling business owners to
serve customers constituted involuntary servitude. This Article detailed the rejection of that argument by Justice Department officials
arguing for the bill before Congress as well by a unanimous Supreme
Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel. It examined Congressional understandings of property rights that viewed antidiscrimination law as a
proper measure to secure the equal rights of all, rather than as an unconstitutional trampling upon private property rights.
The second role played by the Thirteenth Amendment, barely
discernible in Heart of Atlanta Motel, but readily evident in the Congressional hearings on Title II and in the Senate Report, was as an
appropriate constitutional foundation for a public accommodations
ure of states “to provide adequate (or any) state remedies for women injured by gendermotivated violence.” Id. (emphasis in original).
443. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. Reva Siegel and Robert Post come to
mind in these efforts. See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
444. Cf. Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1684 (2001) (retrieving “lost story” of the role of the Thirteenth Amendment and involuntary servitude in the Department of Justice Civil Rights Section’s approach to free labor in its civil rights practice of the 1940s and 1950s).
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law because denial of service on the basis of race was a badge and incident of servitude and a vestige of slavery. On the one hand, the Attorney General and various lawmakers argued that, in light of the fate
of the public accommodations law of 1875, struck down in the Civil
Rights Cases, the prudent, pragmatic course was to rest Title II on
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, rather than on the
Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, although Congress did rest
the law on the commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court upheld the law solely on the basis of the commerce power, thus
avoiding the need to rule on whether Congress’s remaining authority
for the law was adequate. On the other hand, in explaining why the
law was necessary and an urgent moral imperative, the Attorney General and some lawmakers appealed to the Thirteenth Amendment
and argued that such a law was necessary to fulfill the promises of Reconstruction and to remedy the forms of unequal citizenship experienced daily by millions of African-Americans in the United States.
Indeed, some members of Congress would have grounded the bill
more explicitly on the Thirteenth Amendment to clarify what they
viewed as the crux of the matter. To read Heart of Atlanta Motel in isolation from its historical context is to miss this significant role played
by the Thirteenth Amendment.
As I have illustrated by supplementing my analysis of that case
with an examination of contemporary news accounts and legal commentary, a significant part of the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel was
that the Court did uphold Title II and that this new federal civil rights
law did not meet the fate of its 1875 predecessor. Public officials as
well as civil rights activists enlisted this unanimous decision as signaling that the nation spoke in a unified voice and that the Civil Rights
Act, passed after lengthy and often fractious debate in Congress, signaled a milestone in securing long-overdue full and equal citizenship
for African-Americans. The Court’s upholding of Title II, thus, is an
example of institutional branches cooperating and reinforcing each
other, rather than the Court stymieing legislative efforts to fulfill the
promise of the Reconstruction Amendments. To borrow a phrase
from Jack Balkin, we could view the passage of Title II and the Court’s
upholding of it as an example of “constitutional redemption”:
through the efforts of social and political movements to redeem the
unfulfilled promises of the Constitution, Congress enacted a law that
officially repudiated racial segregation in public accommodations,
and the Court lent its imprimatur to this new vision of the Constitu-
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tion and of the meaning of equality. 445 As I have discussed, when
Congress commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the Civil Rights
Act, it interpreted the passage of the law in these same terms of redeeming a promise and completing the unfinished business of Reconstruction, even if Congress pragmatically grounded Title II in its
ample authority under the commerce power.
In upholding Title II, the Court also rejected—as did Congress in
enacting Title II—a vision of the Constitution under which rights to
liberty and private property were an absolute entitlement to be free
from regulations and to engage in arbitrary discrimination. On that
repudiated view, legislation forbidding racial discrimination in serving
the public was a form of compelled—hence, involuntary—servitude.
Instead, such civil rights laws further the goal, as Joseph Singer argues, of a “free and democratic society,” in which there is a “fundamental background principle of equality in the rules governing the
446
marketplace.”
What is the legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel and of the enactment
of Title II for newer generations of antidiscrimination laws and challenges to them? Part of the value of retrieving the complex role of
the Thirteenth Amendment in this context is to appreciate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as an effort by Congress to complete the unfinished business of Reconstruction. Nonetheless, I have also suggested
that several themes in the majority and concurring opinions in that
case have resonance for more recent public accommodations laws
that bar discrimination on such bases as sex and sexual orientation.
These include the following ideas: (1) persons suffer dignitary harm
when they are denied goods and services; (2) discrimination in public
accommodations imposes economic and human costs; (3) antidiscrimination laws address moral evils; (4) conceptions of commerce and
what affects it must take into account the changing nature of the
economy; and (5) antidiscrimination law properly resolves the clash
of rights in a way that furthers the equal basic liberties and freedom of
all citizens.
One argument made against Title II—both at that time and more
447
recently—is that a “free society” must tolerate discrimination. Public accommodations laws reflect a different value judgment with re445. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 121–23 (2011) (describing the
rhetoric of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and arguing that “the language of the
unpaid debt, or the promises yet unfulfilled to be kept in the future, is the most natural
metaphor of hope for eventual constitutional redemption”).
446. Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 199, at 107, 109.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 358–359 and 368.
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spect to entities deemed to be “places of public accommodations.”448
Looking at more recent challenges to public accommodations laws, a
frequent scenario is that such laws forbid discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation or marital/civil union status, and a merchant argues that compelling him or her to serve a same-sex couple violates
constitutional rights to free exercise of religion or freedom of association. Or a religious entity deemed a public accommodation for certain purposes argues that it should be exempted from serving samesex couples. Both those who argue that refusing service is justifiable
and those who argue that it is not look back to the civil rights movement and an earlier generation of civil rights laws, but draw different
conclusions about their import for these more recent conflicts. For
example, the conservative Christian proclamation, The Manhattan Declaration, criticizes “the use of anti-discrimination statutes to force religious institutions, businesses, and service providers of various sorts to
comply with activities they judge to be deeply immoral or go out of
business.” Having to serve same-sex couples, despite religious objections to homosexual relationships, is a prime example. The Manhattan
Declaration appeals to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail to support the place of civil disobedience and to resist
449
This
laws “that purport to compel citizens to do what is unjust.”
statement does not explicitly invoke the Thirteenth Amendment, but
the notion of compelled service may bring involuntary servitude to
mind. By contrast, supporters of the right of same-sex couples to obtain goods and services invoke Heart of Atlanta Motel to emphasize that
public accommodations laws seek to remedy the dignitary harms that
flow from the denial of service; they argue that those who choose to
450
engage in commerce must abide by the rules.
These competing invocations of the legacy of an earlier era’s civil
rights struggles and legislative enactments highlight the continuing
importance of assessing the import of this legacy. As my discussion of
how the Roberts v. United States Jaycees Court deployed Heart of Atlanta
Motel suggested, one vital part of this challenge is examining the role
of analogy between race discrimination and other forms of discrimination, such as that based on sex or sexual orientation. That is a task

448. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN., Civil Rights, Title 10, § 10.5-5 (defining “place of public
accommodation” broadly).
449. Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience, November 20, 2009, at
http://manhattandeclaration.org/the-declaration/read.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
450. See, e.g., Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 149, at 123, 152–53 & 281 n.131.
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in which I, like many others, am currently engaged. 451 My hope is that
this Article might be of some small assistance to others engaged in
that necessary work.

451. See Linda C. McClain, Religious and Political Virtues and Values in Congruence or Conflict?: On Smith, Bob Jones University, and Christian Legal Society, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1959 (2011); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
VIRTUES (book in progress); see also Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from
Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (exploring how the distinctive histories of
civil rights movements addressing race, sex, and sexual orientation might explain the different rules concerning religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws on these three
bases).

